city of criminals

to the people of America,

i’m writing to you regarding my son, gerald e nichols, he has no money and neither do we, he needs an attorney that will work on a Contingency Fee. we truly believe that he has a case here, if we didn’t i would not be wasting your time. if anyone out there that can help, or if you can’t,  but know someone who can or would be willing to take this case on contingency please let us know.

gerald was arrested on 18 march 2013 for intent to sell controlled substance and again on 4 april 2013 and on the 17 of july for failure to appear. he believes that these arrest were set up by his former landlord jeffery deyoung, who he believes did conspire with the sheriff’s office and after going to court the court did also conspire to violate his constitutional rights. i know that this case sounds crazy, but we just need one good attorney to believe in him and what happened to him.

he was arrested on 18 March 2013 at 18:30 hrs and then held for approximately 7hrs and 45mins before being booked, and then was held at least another 65 hrs before being taken before a magistrate, for total hours of 72.5hrs.

on 4 april 2013 this landlord jeffery deyoung called the police and said that gerald was selling drugs again, so the police/sheriff’s saw him parked and did search him and told him that they did find drugs on his person, they didn’t show it to him, they just said that they found it.

on july 17 2013, the day that he was due in court gerald went out to get in his vehicle and lo and behold he had a flat tire, he was due in court at 8:30am, but the police were here waiting for him just down the road, when i took him to the garage to see about getting help to fix his tire that is when the police fell upon him and lied to him asking him his name and giving him a false name, gerald did not resist or try to run away and was kidnapped by the sheriff’s and detained for approximately (2) two hours in the back of a sheriff’s vehicle, handcuffed, no air conditioning, windows rolled up, the temp was about 70 degrees. Plumas county sheriff and detectives then took gerald about 17 miles west towards Quincy and pulled off the side of the road and stopped in a little community called Beckwourth and gerald was taken out of the sheriff’s vehicle and stripped searched. When gerald reached the Plumas county jail he was held for ransom of $200,000.00.

as gerald nichols was going through the court system here in quincy plumas county california  his constitutional rights were violated. below are some of the constitutional rights that have been violated, plus much, much, more…… he has also filed a $25 million dollar lawsuit and i have attached a copy for you. he has already gone to trial and found guilty, but not be sentenced yet, that will be 13 of september 2013.

i have also attached a copy of a motion for a reversal of verdict or new trial, because as you can see from the motion that there are lots of discrepancies that i found in the supplemental police report.

America,  he needs help, today he also received motion for sanctions from one of the defendants. please america help him. he is looking at (8) eight years in the county jail here.

this superior court of plumas county california , is a court of revenue and taxation not a court of justice. when a person goes through this superior court the people are extorted  and forced to waive their rights, oh, the judge will ask has anyone forced you to do this, the person will say no!, but if you want to stay free then you will waive your rights. then you are assessed with huge fines and fees from $25.00 to over $10,000.00 plus any kind of class that they can put you on that you have to pay for. it’s the officers job to tag you, the d.a., job to make sure they maintain the status quo and quash challenges to their criminal enterprise and the judge is there to extract the money, or to put you on a payment plan.

in this court room with judge ira r kaufman one is not permitted a constitutional argument as an affirmative defense, the law need not apply, you are guilty. this is a system where the focus is on fine and fee collection and the court has a financial interest in convictions, not justice. imagine a system where the judge has constructive knowledge they are operating outside the law and they continue to convict en mass. this is not law, it is now an institutionalized criminal enterprise.

America, if you can help, please help him.

PLEASE READ COMPLAINT TO SEE ALL CHARGES OF ACTION AND UNDERSTANDING!

PLUS MORE………………………..

thank you America for any help that you may give him.

dorthy nichols

may jesus always walk beside you

                                                                               LAWSUIT 

Gerald-Edmund: Nichols ‘Pro Per’

Non corporate entity

Free, Sovereign, Natural Person

c/o P O Box 76

Vinton CA 96135

state-of-the California Republic

Authorized Representative, Executor/ Beneficiary

of Ex rational: GERALD E NICHOLS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PLUMAS

_________________________________

Gerald-Edmund: Nichols ‘Pro Per’    )                 CASE NO:___CV 13-00130

Non corporate entity                           )

Free, Sovereign, Natural Person           )     JUDGE: ______________________

Plaintiff,                                              )

Vs                                                        )                                                                                                     )                                                                    COMPLAINT

IRA R  KAUFMAN                                       )     CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATED

Administrator Superior Court             )

JANET HILDE                                         )                 USURPATION

Administrator Superior Court             )                 TYRANNY

DAVD D HOLLISTER                              )                 FRAUD

D. A., PlumasCounty                            )                FICTITIOUS FOREIGN STATE

GREGORGY HAGWOOD                       )               VIOLATION 15 STATUTES AT LARGE

Sheriff , PlumasCounty                       )               CHAPTER  249 § 1 enacted July 27 1868

JOHN/JANE DOE (UNKNOWN)            )                Chap. CCXLIX. —An Act concerning the

Sheriff’s OfficerPlumasCounty          )                Rights of American Citizens in foreign States

JON FATHEREE                              )                 VIOLATION OF FRCP RULE 4(j) 28 USC

Sheriff’s OfficerPlumasCounty       )               CHP  97 – Jurisdictional immunities of Foreign

FEATHER RIVER PUBLISHING             )                States § 1602 – 1611

MICHAEL C. TABORSKI – Owner     )                VIOLATION OF THE 11TH AMENDMENT

/Publisher                                     )                 passed by the Congress on March 4, 1794, and

DAN MCDONALD – Mging Ed           )           ratified by the states on February 7, 1795

KEVIN MALLORY – VP                         )           VIOLATION OF NON CORPORATE ENTITY                                                                   PLUMAS COUNTY CA                        )    VIOLATION OF TRADING WITH THE ENEMY – ACT OF

JEFF de’ YOUNG                              )          1917 § 21

)     FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE FSIA ACT 1976

__________                      _____________________________/       DEFAMATION

INVASION OF PRIVACY/ 4th Amendment

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION of EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

NON CORPORATE ENTITY NON SLAVE OWNER

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

VIOLATIONS TITLE 18 USC

CHP 41 § 872   Extortion

Part I CHP 55 § 1201 Kidnapping

Part I CHP 55 § 1202 Ransom

Part I CHP 115 § 2381 Treason

Part I CHP 115 § 2382 Misprision Of Treason

Part 1 CHP 115 § 2383 Rebellion Or Insurrection

Part 1 CHP 115 § 2384 Seditious Conspiracy

Part 1 CHP 115 § 2385 Advocating Overthrow Of Government

VIOLATIONS TITLE 28 USC

Part 1 CHP 21 § 453 Oaths Of Justices  And Judges

Part 1 CHP 21 § 454 Practice of law by justices and judges

Part 1 CHP 21 § 455 Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge

VIOLATIONS TITLE 42 USC

CHP 21  Subchapter I § 1985

Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

CHP 21 Subchapter I § 1986  Action for neglect to prevent

VIOLATION OF FED RULES OF EVIDENCE  201(d)

VIOLATION OF FED RULES CIVIL PROCEDURES

Rule 60. Relief from a Judgment or Order

4(J), 12(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), & (6)

VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS

1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th & 14th_______________________                 _____________________________________________________________________________

CONGRESS DECLARES BIBLE “THE WORD OF GOD”

 Public Law 97-280, 96stat 1211” Oct 4 1982 & Executive Order 6100 of Sept 22 1990

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Gerald-E: Nichols, Free, Sovereign, Natural Person

Non corporate entity, in propria persona (my own proper self), formerly known as the artificial person, GERALD E NICHOLS.

The petitioner/defendant is not a lawyer and his pleadings cannot be treated as such. In fact, according to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). “[A] pro se petitioner’s pleadings should be liberally construed to do substantial justice.” United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir.1999). Coram non Judice, “In the presence of a person not a judge. When a suit is brought and determined in a court which has no jurisdiction in the matter, then it is said to be Coram non Judice, and the judgment is void.” (See Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 13th Reprint (1998)).2

There is no judicial courts according to FRC vs. GE 281 U.S. 464, Keller vs. PE 261 U.S. 428, 1 Stat. 138-178) “Judges do not enforce statutes and codes. Executive Administrators enforce statutes and codes. There have not been any judges in America since 1789. There have just been administrators.”

“When acting to enforce a statue and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administering or enforcing statues do not act judicially, but merely ministerially.” (See Thompson vs. Smith, 154 SE 583.).

“Without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespasser.” (See Elliot vs. Piersol, 1 pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328)

“When a judge acts when he or she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason.” (See US vs. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. ct, 471, 66 L. Ed. 2nd 392, 406 (1980) Cohen vs. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6wheat) 264, 404 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821)).

“Dismissal of charges is warranted, because of fraud placed on the court.” (See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)).

 CAUSE OF ACTION – INTENTIONAL TORT

The defendant Ira R Kaufman/administrator/judge of PlumasCounty did willfully CONSPIRE with defendant Janet Hilde/administrator/judge of Plumas Co, defendant David D Hollister/D. A., of Plumas Co, defendant Gregory Hagwood. Sheriff of Plumas County and sheriff’s department, and PlumasCounty correctional facility, defendant Jon Fatheree Sheriffs officer, Feather River Publishing-Michael C Taborski-owner/pub., Kevin Mallory, v.p., Dan McDonald managing editor,  Jeff de Young and PlumasCounty did  willfully VIOLATE Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATED:

Usurpation; Tyranny; Fraud; Withholding that the Court is a FICTITIOUS FOREIGN STATE; VIOLATION of 15 statutes at LARGE – CHP 249 sec 1 enacted July 27 1868, CHP CCXLIX – an act concerning the Rights of American Citizens in foreign states;

VIOLATION OF FRCP RULE 4(j) 28 USC CHP 97-Jurisdictional immunities of ForeignState sec 1602-1611;

VIOLATION of the 11th AMENDMENT passed by Congress on March 4, 1794 and ratified by the STATES on February 7, 1795;

VIOLATION OF NON CORPORATE ENTITY;

VIOLATION OF TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT OF 1917 SEC 21;

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE FSIA ACT 1976;

Defamation;

Invasion of PRIVACY/4TH AMENDMENT;

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;

Non Corporate Entity Non Slave Owner;

False Imprisonment;

VIOLATIONS TITLE 18 USC,

CHP 41 SEC 872-Extortion;

PART 1 CHP 55 SEC 1201 Kidnapping,

SEC 1202 Ransom;

PART 1 CHP 115 SEC 2381 Treason,

SEC 2382 Misprision of Treason,

SEC 2383 Rebellion or Insurrection,

SEC 2384 Seditious Conspiracy,

SEC 2385 Advocating Overthrow of Government;

VIOLATIONS OF TITLE 28 USC

PART 1 CHP 21 SEC 453 Oaths of Justices and Judges,

SEC 454 Practices of Law by Justices and Judges,

SEC 455 Disqualification of Justices, Judge or Magistrate Judge; VIOLATIONS

TITLE 42 USC

CHP 21 SUBCHP 1 SEC 1985 Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights,

SEC 1986 Action for Neglect to Prevent;

VIOLATION OF Fed Rules of Evidence 201(d);

VIOLATION OF FRCP RULE 60 Relief from a Judgment or Order,

FRCP 4(j) 12(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) & (6),

VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS:

1ST, 4TH, 5TH, 6TH, 9TH, 10TH, 11TH & 14TH.

PLEASE READ COMPLAINT TO SEE ALL CHARGES OF ACTION AND UNDERSTANDING!

PLUS MORE………………………..

                      

                                 COMPLAINT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATED

                                                                 Preliminary Statement

This is a suit for defamation, invasion of privacy-4th Amendment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, usurpation, tyranny, fictitious foreign state-violation of 15 statutes at large, chapter 249 § 1 enacted July 27 1868, Chap. CCXLIX. —An Act concerning the Rights of American Citizens in foreign States, violation of FRCP RULE 4(j) 28 USC, 1602 – 1611, violation of the 11th amendment passed by the Congress on March 4, 1794, and ratified by the states on February 7, 1795, violation of non corporate entity, violation of Trading With The Enemy – ACT OF 1917 § 21; Failure To Disclose The FSIA Act 1976, ……

VIOLATIONS TITLE 18 USC ;

VIOLATIONS TITLE 18 USC,

CHP 41 § 872   Extortion;

Part I CHP 55 § 1201 Kidnapping

Part I CHP 55 § 1202 Ransom;

Part I CHP 115 § 2381 Treason

Part I CHP 115 § 2382 Misprision Of Treason

Part 1 CHP 115 § 2383 Rebellion Or Insurrection

Part 1 CHP 115 § 2384 Seditious Conspiracy

Part 1 CHP 115 § 2385 Advocating Overthrow Of Government

VIOLATIONS TITLE 28 USC

Part 1 CHP 21 § 453 Oaths Of Justices  And Judges

Part 1 CHP 21 § 454 Practice of law by justices and judges

Part 1 CHP 21 § 455 Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge

VIOLATIONS TITLE 42 USC

CHP 21  Subchapter I § 1985

Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

CHP 21 Subchapter I § 1986  Action for neglect to prevent

VIOLATION OF FED RULES OF EVIDENCE     201(d)

VIOLATION OF FED RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 60. Relief from a Judgment or Order

4(j), 12(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), & (6)

CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS

1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th & 14th

negligence, gross negligence, torture, breach of trust, breach of oath,  breach of duty, breach of fiduciary duties, Treaty violations and human rights violations & international laws/ Treaties  herein alleges that the defendant(s) wrongfully intruded into the plaintiffs place of residence and forcefully and wrongfully seized the plaintiff and all his computer equipment, phones, scanners for emergencies, cell phones that he used to conduct his computer repair business, his little (5) five year old daughters computer and did hereby kidnapped him and did falsely imprisoned him and held him for ransom.

  • · 18th of March 2013, Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested and charges of intent to sell drugs, which were trumped up. Plaintiff was never tested for drugs, in fact one of the arresting officers stated in court that the Plaintiff did not look like he was under the influence and that were cause for plaintiffs arrest and illegally held for over 12 hours in booking where he was forced to be fingerprinted and picture taken. Instead now the plaintiff was subjected to a malicious prosecution and held in a cage and brought before a kangaroo court without subject matter jurisdiction where no corpus delicti was ever found and despite all the overwhelming evidence the plaintiff was innocent and under duress and extortion, plaintiff signed an O. R. release to regain his freedom.
  •  On the 4th April 2013, Plaintiff’s former landlord defendant Jeff de Young did willfully and with malice conspire with the Plumas County sheriff’s department and called the police and told them the Plaintiff was selling drugs to which the Plumas County sheriff’s office did hunt him down like a dog and when the employees of defendant Sheriff Gregory Hagwood, found him and searched him they did plant a little bag of meth in one of the pockets of his pants. The Plaintiff was again kidnapped by the PlumasCounty sheriff’s and again held for ransom of $35,000.00, and his O.R. was then revoked and he was locked away.
  • · Lets us take a moment and look at defendant Sheriff Gregory Hagwood, who in April 2013 claimed to be a Constitutional Sheriff, “neither he nor, any of his officers would ever break or violate a persons Constitutional Rights”, but on 19th July 2013, the defendant told the Plaintiff’s mother that he the defendant had heard of this Constitutional movement and that it was just a “bunch of ‘CRAP’” and that he the defendant would not speak of it again.
  • · Now let us look at the former landlord defendant Jeff de Young, who was arrested on or about the 18th of March 2013, for under and in possession of drugs of which he pled guilty and received between (3) three to (5) five years of probations. This man Jeff de Young cut off his own penis a year or two back and after his current arrest was admitted to the Lakes Crossings Center, when appropriate to provide outpatient evaluations of competency, located at 500 Galletti Way  Sparks, NV 89431, mr de Young also painted the inside of his house with big red X’s, hung up a hangman’s noose and wrote all over the walls kill everyone, and again was admitted to another mental facility called West Hills Hospital which provides a full range of behavioral and mental health care services and chemical dependency treatment, located at 1240 East Ninth Street Reno, Nevada 89512. so, we ask ourselves why would the sheriff’s department accept the word of a person who himself was arrested for possession and under the influence and a mental patient, because he is well know and friends with the sheriffs.
  • ·18th of March 2013, the sheriff’s found $150.00 on Plaintiff’s person, which was given to him by his father and sister, 4th of April 2013, the sheriff’s again found $150.00 on Plaintiff’s person money of which was given to him by his father and sister and of which they (the sheriff’s) classified as drug money both times and stole it. So, again, under duress the plaintiff signed a bail bond for $35,000.00 to obtain his freedom and to be able to fight these false charges. The plaintiff appeared at Superior Court of California in Quincy, Plumas County California under duress on March 21 and 22, 2013, April 5th , 8th, 12th, 15th, 19th, 2013,  May 3rd, and 17th, 2013,  June 14th, and 28th, 2013, July 8th, 12th, 16th, 17th due in court, but defendant sheriff’s officer Jon Fatheree detained him from 9:30am to approximately 2pm, knowingly that the Plaintiff was due in court that morning, but instead of taking the Plaintiff to court as the Plaintiff’s mother asked Plaintiff was taken to jail. Plaintiff also under duress being held in jail went to court July 19th, 22nd, (23rd (Plaintiff was not listed on docket) 2013, and again under duress (Aug 2nd (again not listed on docket) future date of Aug 14th, 2013 for trial. The Plaintiff is still being imprisoned illegally

The Plaintiff was defamed by the sheriff’s office releasing a story in the defendants Feather River Publishing newspaper and on line Plumas County News,Seven arrested on methamphetamine  related charges by Dan McDonald Managing Editor 3/28/2013; http://www.plumasnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10792:seven-arrested-on-methamphetamine-related-charges&catid=69:-headline-news&Itemid=6

and in plastering his picture all over the country and calling him a criminal, was forced into having his fingerprints and picture taken, not only at the jail, but in court the Plaintiff was forced by the bulldog bailiff sheriffs officer Steve Small, who grabbed his wrist and forced his fingerprint onto a paper, all the while the Plaintiff was protesting. This was done in front of court room of people which defamed him even more. Each time Plaintiff is brought to court he is restrained in manacles and grey and white stripped like pajamas, which causes the people to automatically assume his guilt.

Plaintiff is always last person to be seen in court, not letting any other prisoners in the court room, because the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman and defendant D. A., Hollister do not want other prisoners to hear Plaintiff’s defense.

The Plaintiff at each court date from 8th of April 2013 to the present of 8th of July 2013, did hereby request to have ‘Pro Per’ status; the defendant administrator/judge gave Plaintiff a form of competence test about the law. the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman told Plaintiff that if he let Plaintiff represent himself he would have to do so by himself and with no help from counselors or adequate attorney and would be treated just as any other attorney, this would give the Plaintiff (3) three days to prepare his case. There is no law library at the jail where Plaintiff is incarcerated.  Plaintiff requested the use of a law library and computer to access the internet to be able to prepare his case, but the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman refused this request and told Plaintiff that he could use the library at the jail, again there is no law library at the jail.

When Plaintiff asked the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman a question, the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman told Plaintiff that he the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman was not there to answer questions, but to ask them.

The defendant administrator/judge Kaufman continually interrupted and intimidated Plaintiff, then defendant administrator/judge denied Plaintiff to represent himself with counsel and said that Plaintiff was intelligent and passed the competence test but he defendant administrator/judge Kaufman didn’t like the answers that he defendant administrator/judge Kaufman was getting from Plaintiff and that the public defender would stay as attorney of record.

Let me tell you since this happened in March 2013, through to the current date it has been a nightmare, especially over the last (8) eight weeks. Finally, the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman allows Plaintiff to represent himself as ‘pro per’. but with not enough time to prepare, and no consul at all of any kind, unless it was the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman  and the defendant D.A. hollister’s  kind of counsel.

When Plaintiff was in court 16th July 2013, for motion hearings, (motions that were filed see below), every motion was denied, without discussion, and which Plaintiff believes were not even read by defendant administrator/judge Kaufman or defendant D. A., Hollister. Plaintiff asked the court if they had read the motions and received no answer.

FILED MOTIONS:

 1)   8 USC § 1481 Loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizen; voluntary action; burden of proof; presumptions:

(2) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal Declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen
        years; or
(4)(A) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after attaining the age of eighteen years if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state; or 
(B) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after attaining the age of eighteen years for which office, post, or employment an oath, affirmation, or declaration of allegiance is required; or
2)   8 USC § 1324a - Unlawful employment of aliens

3)   TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE; IN THE                

NATURE OF A WRIT OF ERROR, CORAM NOBIS, AND A DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE PROPER  JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4)   TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE; IN THE NATURE OF WRIT OF ERROR, CORAM  NON JUDICE, AND A DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE PROPER JURISDICTION AND VENUE

 5)   MEMORANDUM AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.                ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE; IN THE NATURE OF WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS NON SLAVE OWNER UNDER THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT SEPTEMBER 18, 1850

6)   Petition to withdraw plea and request as in the 6th and 1st amendments right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to associate and petition for redress.

7)   JUDICIAL NOTICE NOTICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT ALL COURTS ARE OPERATING UNDER(1) TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT AS CODIFIED IN TITLE 50 USC, (2) TITLE 28 USC, CHAPTER 176, FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE, AND (see Statement under Trading with the Enemy Act  (pg 17)

8)   A statement by Linda Brown State of California deputy director of the Office of Administrative Law,

“We exercise our copyright to benefit the people of California,” said Linda Brown, State of California deputy director of the Office of Administrative Law, which manages the state’s laws. “We are obtaining compensation for the people of California.  “In other words, we hide the laws you have to obey from you in order to get more money into the state’s coffers.”

      http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080904/0433382169.shtml

Sounds like extortion to me!

 Plaintiff begin to read  the motion TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE; IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT OF ERROR, CORAM NOBIS, AND A DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE PROPER JURISDICTION AND VENUE.  After Plaintiff had read about a paragraph when defendant administrator/judge Kaufman stated that he (defendant administrator/judge Kaufman) was not going to allow Plaintiff to read the whole motion into the record, and all of the motions were denied. Defendant administrator/judge Kaufman then told Plaintiff that he would see Plaintiff in jail by Wednesday afternoon 17th of July 2013, at which time Plaintiff surrendered his birth certificate.

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as all those who enter in that court room, have been stomped on. Plaintiff was due in court for trial 17th July 2013, but that morning Plaintiff had a flat tire, the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman immediately had Plaintiff arrested and held on a EXORBITANT amount of bail of $200,000.00. This defendant administrator/judge Kaufman will let a high profile case go on their O.R., by extorting their freedom from them, but Plaintiff points how the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman is not really a judge just an administrator. Please see case (‘no judges in America since 1789, there have just been administrators): -FRC vs GE 281 U.S. 464,  Keller vs PE 261 U.S. 428, 1 stat 138-178.

When Plaintiff went back into court on the 22nd July 2013, Plaintiff asked the judge at least 10 times to keep his ‘pro per’ status and to have adequate counsel and the defendant administrator/judge  Kaufman refused, and reappointed the public defender that Plaintiff had in the beginning, and this public defender only gives the defense that the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman and defendant D. A., Hollister want Plaintiff to have. Same day 22nd July 2013, Plaintiff asked about the gag order that the defendant D. A., Hollister  had requested on 12th of July 2013,  and the defendant administrator/judge so ordered, Plaintiff never saw anything signed but, the  defendant administrator/judge did speak it in court, how defendant D. A., Hollister had release the story 28th March 2013 and plastered Plaintiff’s face all over the country and calling him a criminal, Plaintiff asked “how will I get a fair trial?” Plaintiff also asked the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman and defendant D. A., Hollister to recuse themselves and did this seem fair to them. No answer from either defendant. Plaintiff also asked anyone in the court room if this seemed fair?, only one person answered Plaintiff’s question. Two (2) days later on 24th July 2013, the defendant D. A., Hollister broke his own and the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman’s gag order with Conspiracy and the help of the town paper defendants Feather River Publishing released a story about Plaintiff. “Man Facing Drug Charges Tests Court’s Patience before Trial”by Dan McDonald Managing Editor” (see Feather River Bulletin dated 24th July 2013) and it is full of lies and discrepancies. Plaintiff’s mother and father went to Feather River Publishing this last April 2013 and spoke with Dan McDonald (managing editor)asked for this case to be investigated, but they refused, again Plaintiff’s mother and father went on 23rd July 2013 and asked for defendants Feather River Publishing to investigate the defendant Kaufman, defendant D. A., Hollister and the defendant Gregory Hagwood, Plumas County Sheriff and defendants department in the crimes that they were committing, and to speak with Plaintiff they refuse, but the story that defendant D.A., Hollister had released about Plaintiff had already been printed and in the newspaper.

So, Plaintiff ask you how is he to get a fair trial?

Plaintiff’s parents have called all over the state of California for help. Parents called the Governors office, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.Marshalls, Highway Patrol, and other law enforcement outside of this county of PlumasCalifornia, and was told its not their jurisdiction.

Plaintiff’s parents have also learned that there are no checks and balances on what these defendants administrators/judges can do. They have the right to set themselves up as GODs on earth, because evidently they are beyond the arms of the law.

This is not the only county that this is happening to it is happening in little communities across the nation, how many videos and news stories are out there about judges, d.a., and law enforcement that are not abiding by the constitution.

According to the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, clause 2) of the United States Constitution, This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. As the Supreme Court stated in Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008), a federal law that conflicts with a state law will trump, or “preempt”, that state law:

Consistent with that command, we have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981) the defendants administrators/judges of this court took an oath to uphold and support the constitution of California, and his blatant disregard of that obligation and allegiance can only result in an act of TREASON.

If this court departs from the clear meaning of the constitution, it will be regarded as a blatant act of TYRANNY. Any exercise of power which is done without the support of law or beyond what the law allows is TYRANNY.

It has been said, with much truth, “here the law ends, tyranny begins.” ‘Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 702 (1881)

The constitution requires that all laws have enacting clauses and titles. If these clear and unambiguous provisions of the state constitution can be disregarded, then we no longer have a constitution in this state, and we no longer live under a government of laws but a government of men, i.e., a system that is governed by the arbitrary will of those in office.

The creation of the “California statues” is a typical example of the arbitrary acts of government which have become all too prevalent in this century. Its use as law is a nullity under our constitution.

A Maxim of Law states: a judge who exceeds his office or jurisdiction is not to be obeyed. He who exercises judicial authority beyond his proper limits can not be obeyed with safety or impunity. (see Maxim of Law, edited by C. Weisman, 63z, 66m)

These defendants administrators/judge’s Kaufman and Hilde have become  rogue along with the defendant D. A., Hollister and defendant sheriff Gregory Hagwood and his department, (Jane/John Does to be named) Plaintiff was told by a person who had been stopped outside of Plumas County by a Highway patrol officer, that he (the person) had a warrant for his arrest from Plumas County, but, he  (the officer) was going to let the person go, because Plumas County had their own set of laws, and when you ask one of their own officers “how can you do this when you know its wrong?” He makes the statement that he “has (3) three little babies and a mortgage”.

Plaintiff on 16th of July 2013, went before defendant administrator/judge Hilde for a fee waiver for his complaint/lawsuit against defendant D. A., Hollister, in knowing that Plaintiff was to be in court on 17th July 2013 for trial, and did CONSPIRE with defendant D. A., Hollister and defendant administrator/judge Kaufman to deny Plaintiff’s fee waiver and not to give an answer on 16th July 2013 knowing that she (defendant administrator/judge Hilde) was named in Plaintiff’s complaint/lawsuit.

Defendant administrator/judge Hilde stated that she would have to take this under consideration and would mail out her (defendant administrator/judge Hilde) decision on the 17th July 2013, which was not mailed out until the 18th July 2013, knowing that Plaintiff was already in custody at the county jail, and being denied Plaintiff would not be able to pay the $435.00 filing fee.

 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence 201(d) NO CHARGE FOR FILING,

MANDATORY NOTICE

Please take mandatory notice (Federal Rules of Evidence 201(d)) that Plaintiff has a lawful right to proceed without cost, based upon the following law: The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a natural individual entitled to relief is entitled to free access to its judicial tribunals and public offices in every State in the Union (2 Black 620, see also Crandell v. Nevada, 6 Wall 35). Plaintiff should not be charged fees, or costs for the lawful and constitutional right to petition this court in this matter in which he is entitled to relief, as it appears that the filing fee rule was originally implemented for fictions and subjects of the State and should not be applied to the Plaintiff who is a natural individual and entitled to relief (Hale v. Henkel)( 201 U.S. 43)

Plaintiff Gerald-E: Nichols;  Free, Sovereign, Natural Person and Non corporate entity has been maliciously prosecuted and offered deals to plead guilty to intent to sell drugs and do (2) two years in the county jail, which Plaintiff is not guilty of,  the Plaintiff refused so he may appeal his case if so convicted. The plaintiff has had ineffective assistance of counsel only receiving the counsel that the defendants administrators/judges Kaufman/Hilde and defendant D. A. Hollister wishes him to have.

Plaintiff has continued to state throughout this process that Plaintiff is trying to respect the court by stating that Plaintiff is in court on a special appearance for the name on the docket GERALD E NICHOLS – corporation. The court record will show obvious violations of the Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights and basic human rights by when the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman does not even recognize Plaintiff, tells him to shut-up and not speak.

Furthermore, as stated above the plaintiff filed an action as soon as he was able to acquire as much information as possible.  There is so much more that has happened where this here could be a short story.

‘Plaintiff begs the courts indulgence.’

I have been under false imprisonments and subjected to blatant violations of my Constitutional Rights, which is the overwhelming cause for this action. It has caused  me so much frustration, emotional distress, anxiety,  I’m not able to visit with my parents,  the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman refused Plaintiff the use of a law library or computer to help Plaintiff build a case, and because defendant administrator/judge Kaufman did not like Plaintiff’s answers took away Plaintiff’s  right to ‘Pro Per’ status and re-appointed Public Defender that Plaintiff had in the beginning. Defendant D. A., Hollister made sexually explicit advances at the Plaintiff, by dancing around the court room and throwing Plaintiff kisses.

I ask you is this fair?

This is not how free societies operates we are suppose to have due process in this country. Plaintiff was laughed at by the defendant Sheriff Gregory Hagwood, when Plaintiff wrote him a letter and explained what was happening. Defendant Sheriff Gregory Hagwood asked Plaintiff where Plaintiff would like to be deported, defendant said that he was thinking of Somaila, because Plaintiff had asked to be deported because he was not a citizen of the United States, but a Republic of America Citizen.

Plaintiff explained by Constitutional Mandate, all laws must have an enacting clause.  One of the forms that all laws are required to follow by the Constitution of California (1849), is that they contain an enacting style or clause. This provision is stated as follows:

Article IV § 1. (1849) the style of all laws of this State shall be: “Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of California” (1849)

The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.

None of the laws cited in the complaints against the Plaintiff, as found in the “California Statutes,” contain any enacting clause.

The constitutional provision which prescribes an enacting clause for all laws is not

directory, but is mandatory. This provision is to be strictly adhered to as asserted by

the Supreme Court of California:

Upon both principle and authority, we hold that article 4, of our constitution, which

provides that “the style of all laws of this state shall be, ‘Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of California,’” is mandatory, and that a statute without any enacting clause is void. Sjoberg v. Security Savings & Loan Assn, 73 Minn. 203, 212 (1898).

CALIFORNIA STATUTES 1849-1953

The present Codes were adopted in 1872. They did not, however, even at that time constitute a complete revision of the law. Since then no general revision has even been attempted. The situation today, therefore, is that there are four Codes and, in addition, about twenty-one thousand laws, contained in fifty volumes, and no one knows what laws are in force and what are not.

 The California statutory law is in a deplorable condition. Familiarity with it tends to blind practitioners to its defects, but law writers and publishers unite in considering it the worst statutory law in the country. The Commission concluded that the statutes could not be put into the four 1872 Codes and that, if they could be, hopeless confusion would result

 What is the Purpose of the Constitutional Provision for an Enacting Clause?

To determine the validity of using laws without an exacting clause against citizens,

we need to determine the purpose and function of an enacting clause; and also to see

what problems or evils were intended to be avoided by including such a provision in

our State Constitution. One object of the constitutional mandate for an enacting

clause is to show that the law is one enacted by the legislative body which has been

given the lawmaking authority under the Constitution.

The purpose of thus prescribing an enacting clause-”the style of the acts” -is to establish it; to give it permanence, uniformity, and certainty; to identify the act of legislation as of the general assembly; to afford evidence of its legislative statutory nature; and to secure uniformity of identification, and thus prevent inadvertence, possibly mistake and fraud. State v. Patterson, 4 S.E. 350, 352, 98 N.C. 660 (1887); 82 C.J.S. “Statutes,”§ 65, p. 104; Joiner v. State, 155 S.E.2d 8, 10, 223 Ga. 367 (1967).

What is the object of the style of a bill or enacting clause anyway? To show the authority by which the bill is enacted into law; to show that the act comes from a place pointed out by the Constitution as the source of legislation. Ferrill v. Keel, 151 S.W. 269, 272, 105 Ark. 380 (1912).

To fulfill the purpose of identifying the lawmaking authority of a law, it has been

repeatedly declared by the courts of this land that an enacting clause is to appear

on the face of every law which the people are expected to follow and obey.

The “California Statutes” are published by the Revisor of Statutes, and are also

copyrighted by him or his office. The “Session Laws” were never copyrighted as they

are true public documents. In fact no true public document of this state or any state

or of the United States has been or can be under a copyright. Public documents are

in the public domain. A copyright infers a private right over the contents of a book,

suggesting that the laws in the “California Statutes” are derived from a private source, and thus are not true public laws.

“We exercise our copyright to benefit the people of California,” said Linda Brown, State of California deputy director of the Office of Administrative Law, which manages the state’s laws. “We are obtaining compensation for the people of California.”In other words, we hide the laws you have to obey from you in order to get more money into the state’s coffers.” http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080904/0433382169.shtml

Again,  Sounds like EXTORTIONto me!

All of Plaintiff’s motions and pleadings were denied, clams filed with the state and county have all been denied and Plaintiff must enforce the de jure laws of this land and remind the defendants where they get there authority from, its nothing personal its just business/ commerce the defendants’  causing physical and emotional damages. In addition, defendants’ conduct was so intentional and outrageous that the imposition of punitive damages is appropriate to punish the defendants for their actions and to deter the defendants from further reprehensible conduct. And violations of the following laws and also other rights and remedies contained within the original complaint or any Grievance forms or claim forms, demand letters and statements of damages Plaintiff seeks relief under all said claims and by this complaint from every defendant known and currently any Jane or John Doe defendant unknown who has alleged participated or someone who has violated each and everyone of the specifically stated codes or international treaties, laws, ect; to wit:

Stated Codes Or International Treaties, Laws, Ect

USURPATION

The crime of usurpation occurs when any person unlawfully arrogates to himself power or authority, either in the form of an office, elected or appointed, or in powers not due that office.

Two Treatises on Government (1680-1690) by John Locke; Book II CHP 17 of Usurpation.

§ 197. As conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference – that an usurper can never have right on his side, it being no usurpation but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to. This, so far as it is usurpation, is a change only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the government; for if the usurper extend his power beyond what, of right, belonged to the lawful princes or governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to usurpation.

§ 198. In all lawful governments the designation of the persons who are to bear rule being as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government itself, and that which had its establishment originally from the people – the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at all, or to agree that it shall be monarchical, yet appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power and be the monarch – all commonwealths, therefore, with the form of government established, have rules also of appointing and conveying the right to those who are to have any share in the public authority; and whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power by other ways than what the laws of the community have prescribed hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved, since he is not the person the laws have appointed, and, consequently, not the person the people have consented to. Nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title till the people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented, to allow and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped.

TYRANNY      by Jon Roland

Definition of tyranny

Tyranny is usually thought of as cruel and oppressive, and it often is, but the original definition of the term was rule by persons who lack legitimacy, whether they be malign or benevolent. Historically, benign tyrannies have tended to be insecure, and to try to maintain their power by becoming increasingly oppressive. Therefore, rule that initially seems benign is inherently dangerous, and the only security is to maintain legitimacy — an unbroken accountability to the people through the framework of a written constitution that provides for election of key officials and the division of powers among branches and officials in a way that avoids concentration of powers in the hands of a few persons who might then abuse those powers.

Tyranny is an important phenomenon that operates by principles by which it can be recognized in its early emerging stages, and, if the people are vigilant, prepared, and committed to liberty, countered before it becomes entrenched.

Undue official influence on trials and juries

Nonrandom selection of jury panels, exclusion of those opposed to the law, exclusion of the jury from hearing argument on the law, exclusion of private prosecutors from access to the grand jury, and prevention of parties and their counsels from making effective arguments or challenging the government.

FICTITIOUS FOREIGN STATE

Under Title 28, sec 1391 this court under the heading of The United States District Court or United States district court falls under chapter 97 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES as a Foreign State Court.

a) This information was not properly disclosed at the time of the filing in this case by the clerk of court, or

b) it was not disclosed by the Court / judge, or

c) by the Prosecution, or

d) by a / the attorney(s) at the time of arraignment, trial or sentencing.

This Court is defined under FRCP Rule 4 (j) as a FOREIGN STATE as defined under 28 USC, CHAPTER 97—JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES, Sec. 1602 -1611. The FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT (FSIA) allows the petitioner to challenge jurisdiction, therefore full disclosure of the true jurisdiction of the Court.

Any failure to disclose the true jurisdiction is a violation of 15 Statutes at Large, Chapter 249 (section 1), enacted July 27 1868

Chap. CCXLIX. —An Act concerning the Rights of American Citizens in foreign States

Whereas the rights of expatriation is a nature and inherent  right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty,  and the pursuit of happiness;  and whereas in the recognition of this principle this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the right of citizenship; and whereas  it is claimed that such American citizens,  with their descendants,  are subjects of foreign states,  owing allegiance to the government thereof;  and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign  allegiance should be promptly   and   finally disavowed;

Thereof.

Be it enacted  by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of American in Congress assembled, That  any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision, of any  officers of is government which denies.,  restricts ,  impairs or questions the rights of expatriation , is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government.

FRAUD

 A false representation of a matter of fact—whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should have been disclosed—that deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it to her or his legal injury.

The first issue of fraud is the deception of the Court’s proper Name from that of the People’s proper Constitutional court to that of the corporation court name.

a) the fact that the petitioner has been denied the use of constitutionally protected rights under the Bill of Rights, and

b) the fact that the Petitioner has been denied the use of this States’ and the federal statutory laws as a defense, and

c) and the denial of the use of Acts of Congress, and

d) that this action is a direct violation of the Clearfield Trust Doctrine.

      The second issue of fraud is that “there is but one cause of action and that is civil,” and this Court has this Petitioner in a “criminal action.”

      The third issue of fraud is that all criminal action comes under Title 50 USC,  chapter 3, Alien Enemy, in Appendix section 23, Jurisdiction of the United States court and judges.

a) This Court has fraudulently allowed the prosecution and attorneys in declaring (or assuming) this Petitioner is an “enemy of the State” by the use of the “State of Emergency,” under

b) The 1933 national State of Emergency clause resulting in the kidnapping and extortion with intent to cause harm to this petitioner, and

c) This was not disclosed to the petitioner by the Court, the prosecution or by the attorney/s at the time of arraignment, trial or sentencing, and, see:

 The fourth issue of fraud is that the Court, the prosecution and the attorney all have full knowledge of the 1959 Executive Order 10834 that placed this Court under the State of Emergency and under jurisdiction the presidential flag and of military jurisdiction.

a) This Court and its Court officers are in violation of the Military Commission Act, and

b) in violation of the General Orders 100 under the Lieber Code (“INSTRUCTIONS for the GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES of THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD” prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., (Originally issued as GENERAL ORDERS No. 100, Adjutant General’s Office, 1863)), and

c) of Executive Order 10834, Sec. 24.

(a) The Secretary of Defense in respect of procurement for the Department of        Defense (including military colors) and the Administrator of General Services in     respect of procurement for executive agencies other than the Department of       Defense may, for cause which the Secretary or the Administrator, as the case may           be, deems sufficient, make necessary minor adjustments in one or more of the        dimensions or proportionate dimensions prescribed by this order, or authorize proportions or sizes other than those prescribed by section 3 or section 21 of this order.

TITLE 50, APPENDIX App. > TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT OF 1917,   § 21

§ 21. Claims of naturalized citizens as affected by expatriation

The claim of any naturalized American citizen under the provisions of this Act       [sections 1 to 6, 7 to 39, and 41 to 44 of this Appendix] shall not be denied on the          ground of any presumption of expatriation which has arisen against him, under        the second sentence of section 2 of the Act entitled “An Act in reference to the             expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad,” approved March 2, 1907, if    he shall give satisfactory evidence to the President, or the court, as the case may       be, of his uninterrupted loyalty to the United States during his absence, and that          he has returned to the United States, or that he, although desiring to return, has       been prevented from so returning by circumstances beyond his control.

JUDICIAL NOTICE NOTICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

ALL COURTS ARE OPERATING UNDER

(1) TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT AS CODIFIED IN

TITLE 50 USC,

(2) TITLE 28 USC, CHAPTER 176, FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE, AND

(3) FED.R.CIV.P. 4(j) UNDER TITLE 28 USC §1608,MAKING THE COURTS “FOREIGN STATES” TO THE PEOPLEBY CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE”IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO DECLARE THE MEANING OF WHAT IS WRITTEN, AND NOT WHAT WAS INTENDED TO BE WRITTEN. J.W. Seavey Hop Corp. v. Pollock, 20 Wn.2d 337,348-49, 147 P.2d 310 (1944), cited with approval in Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn2d at 669.

Plaintiff gave  JUDICIAL NOTICE, that the defendant administrator/judge/court lacks jurisdiction to hear, convict, or bring any case against this Petitioner under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(j),12(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) & (6) as well as the 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 14th amendments of the Constitution, whereby Petitioner is not subject to a Foreign State

ISSUE ONE:

OATH OF OFFICE MAKES PUBLIC OFFICIALS “FOREIGN”

1.  Those holding Federal or State public office, county or municipal office, under the Legislative, Executive or Judicial branch, including Court Officials, Judges, Prosecutors, Law Enforcement Department employees, Officers of the Court, and etc., before entering into these public offices, are required by the U.S. Constitution and statutory law to comply with Title 5 USC, Sec. §3331, “Oath of office.”  State Officials are also required to meet this same obligation, according to State Constitutions and State statutory law.

2.  All oaths of office come under 22 CFR, Foreign Relations, Sections §§92.12 – 92.30, and all who hold public office come under Title 8 USC, Section §1481 “Loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizen; voluntary action; burden of proof; presumptions.”

3. Under Title 22 USC, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Section §611, a Public Official is considered a foreign agent.  In order to hold public office, the candidate must file a true and complete registration statement with the State Attorney General as a foreign principle.

4. The Oath of Office requires the public official in his / her foreign state capacity to uphold the constitutional form of government or face consequences.

Title 10 USC, Sec. §333, “Interference with State and Federal law”

The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

5.  Such willful action, while serving in official capacity, violates Title 18 USC, Section §1918:

Title 18 USC, Section §1918 “Disloyalty and asserting the right to strike against the government”

Whoever violates the provision of 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government; (2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both.

and also deprives claimants of “honest services:

Title 18, Section §1346.  Definition of “scheme or artifice to defraud”

“For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

ISSUE TWO:
JUDGE SERVES AS A DEBT COLLECTOR

6.  Judges hold public office under Title 28 USC, Chapter 176, Federal Debt Collection Procedure:

Title 28, Chapter 176, Federal Debt Collection Procedure, Section §3002

As used in this chapter:

(2) “Court” means any court created by the Congress of the United States, excluding the United States Tax Court. (3) “Debt” means—

(A) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a direct loan, or loan insured or guaranteed, by the United States; or (B) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property, overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by the United  States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States, but that is not owing under the terms of a contract originally entered into by only persons other than the United States;

(8) “Judgment” means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.  (15) “United States” means—

(A) a Federal corporation; (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or (C) an instrumentality of the United States.

Title 22 USC, Sec. §286. “Acceptance of membership by United States in International Monetary Fund,” states the following:

The President is hereby authorized to accept membership for the United States in the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred to as the “Fund”), and in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”), provided for by the Articles of Agreement of the Fund and the Articles of Agreement of the Bank as set forth in the Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference dated July 22, 1944, and deposited in the archives of the Department of State.

8.  Title 22 USC, Sec. § 286e-13, “Approval of fund pledge to sell gold to provide resources for Reserve Account of Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust,” states the following:

The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to instruct the Fund’s pledge to sell, if needed, up to 3,000,000 ounces of the Fund’s gold, to restore the resources of the Reserve Account of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust to a level that would be sufficient to meet obligations of the Trust payable to lenders which have made loans to the Loan Account of the Trust that have been used for the purpose of financing programs to Fund members previously in arrears to the Fund.

ISSUE THREE:
NO IMMUNITY UNDER “COMMERCE”

9.  All immunity of the United States, and all liability of States, instrumentalities of States, and State officials have been waived under commerce, according to the following US Codes:

Title 15 USC, Commerce, Sec. §1122, “Liability of States, instrumentalities of States, and State officials”

(a) Waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States. The United States, all agencies and instrumentalities thereof, and all individuals, firms, corporations, other persons acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall not be immune from suit in Federal or State court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for any violation under this Act.  (b) Waiver of sovereign immunity by States. Any State, instrumentality of a State or any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity for any violation under this Act.

Title 42 USC, Sec. §12202, “State immunity”

A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State

           Title 42 USC, Sec. §2000d–7, “Civil rights remedies equalization”

(a) General provision

(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 794], title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance. (2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.

10.  The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 gives immunity in Administrative Court to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) only when an action is brought by the people against a public, agency or corporate official / department. Under Title 5 USC, Commerce, public offices or officials can be sanctioned.

Title 5, USC, Sec. §551:

(10) “sanction” includes the whole or a part of an agency—

(A) prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of a person;(B) withholding of relief;(C) imposition of penalty or fine;(D) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of property;(E) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees;(F) requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license; or

(G) taking other compulsory or restrictive action;

11.  Justice is required to be BLIND while holding a SET OF SCALES and a TWO-EDGED SWORD.  This symbolizes true justice.  The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (60 stat 237) would allow the sword to cut in either direction and give the judge immunity by holding his own court office accountable for honest service fraud, obstruction of justice, false statements, malicious prosecution and fraud placed upon the court.  Any willful intent to uncover the EYES OF JUSTICE or TILT THE SCALES  is a willful intent to deny Due Process, which violates Title 18 USC §1346, “Scheme or Artifice to Defraud,” by perpetrating a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.  This is considered fraud and an overthrow of a constitutional form of government and the person depriving the honest service can be held accountable and face punishment under Title 18 USC and Title 42 USC and violates Title 28 USC judicial procedures.

12.  Both Title 18 USC, Crime and Criminal Procedure, and Title 42 USC, Public Health and Welfare, allow the Petitioner to bring an action against the United States and/or the State agencies, departments, and employees for civil rights violations while dealing in commerce. Title 10 places all public officials under this Title10 section 333 while under a state of emergency. (Declare or undeclared War this fall under TWEA.)

ISSUE FOUR:

COURTS OPERATING UNDER WAR POWERS ACT

13.  The Courts are operating under the Emergency War Powers Act.  The country has been under a declared “state of emergency” for the past 70 years resulting in the Constitution being suspended (See Title 50 USC Appendix – Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917).  The Courts have been misusing Title 50 USC, Sec. §23, “Jurisdiction of United States courts and judges,” which provides for criminal jurisdiction over an “enemy of the state,” whereas, Petitioner comes under Title 50 USC Appendix Application Sec. §21, “Claims of naturalized citizens as affected by expatriation” which states the following:

The claim of any naturalized American citizen under the provisions of this Act [sections 1 to 6, 7 to 39, and 41 to 44 of this Appendix] shall not be denied on the ground of any presumption of expatriation which has arisen against him, under the second sentence of section 2 of the Act entitled “An Act in reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad,” approved March 2, 1907, if he shall give satisfactory evidence to the President, or the court, as the case may be, of his uninterrupted loyalty to the United States during his absence, and that he has returned to the United States, or that he, although desiring to return, has been prevented from so returning by circumstances beyond his control.

14.  15 Statutes at Large, Chapter 249 (section 1), enacted July 27 1868, states the following:

PREAMBLE – Rights of American citizens in foreign states.

WHEREAS the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this principle this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed.

SECTION I – Right of expatriation declared.

THEREFORE, Be it enacted by the Senate of the and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government.

SECTION II – Protection to naturalized citizens in foreign states.

And it is further enacted, That all naturalized citizens of the United States, while in foreign states, shall be entitled to, and shall receive from this government, the same protection of persons and property that is accorded to native born citizens in like situations and circumstances. SECTION III – Release of citizens imprisoned by foreign governments to be demanded.

And it is further enacted, That whenever it shall be made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons for such imprisonment, and if it appears to be wrongful and in the violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, it shall be the duty of the President to use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate such release, and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.

Approved, July 27, 1868

15.  The Courts and the States are enforcing the following code on American nationals:  Title 50 USC Appendix App, Trading, Act, Sec. §4, “Licenses to enemy or ally of enemy insurance or reinsurance companies; change of name; doing business in United States,” as a result of the passage of The Amendatory Act of March 9, 1933 to Title 50 USC, Trading with the Enemy Act Public Law No. 65-91 (40 Stat. L. 411) October 6, 1917.  The original Trading with the Enemy Act excluded the people of the United States from being classified as the enemy when involved in transactions wholly within the United States.  The Amendatory Act of March 9, 1933, however, included the people of the United States as the enemy, by incorporating the following language into the Trading With The Enemy Act: “by any person within the United States.”  The abuses perpetrated upon the American people are the result of Title 50 USC, Trading With The Enemy Act, which turned the American people into “enemy of the state.”

ISSUE FIVE:
LANGUAGE NOT CLARIFIED

16.  Clarification of language:

the State of California has failed to state the meaning or clarify the definition of words.  The Petitioner places before the Court legal definitions and terms, along with NOTICE OF FOREIGN STATE STATUS OF THE COURT.  This court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 4(j), is, in fact and at law, a FOREIGN STATE as defined in Title 28 USC §1602, et. seq., the FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583 (hereafter FSIA), and, therefore, lacks jurisdiction in the above captioned case.  The above-mentioned “real party in interest” hereby demands full disclosure of the true and limited jurisdiction of this court. Any such failure violates 18 USC §1001, §1505, and §2331.  This now violates the PATRIOT ACT, Section 800, Domestic terrorism.

17. There are three different and distinct forms of the “United States” as revealed by this case law:

“The high Court confirmed that the term “United States” can and does mean three completely different things, depending on the context.”  Hooven & Allison Co. vs. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) & United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) & United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. 3 Wheat. 336 336 (1818)

The Court and its officers have failed to state which United States they represent, since they can represent only one, and it’s under Federal Debt Collection Procedure, as a corporation, the United States has no jurisdiction over the Petitioner.  As an American national and as a belligerent claimant, Petitioner hereby asserts the right of immunity inherent in the 11th amendment: “The judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens of any Foreign State.”  This court, by definition is a FOREIGN STATE, and is misusing the name of this Sovereign American  by placing Petitioner’s name in all capital letters, as well as by using Petitioner’s last name to construe Petitioner erroneously, as a “person” which is a “term of art” meaning: a creature of the law, an artificial being, and a CORPORATION or ens legis:

“Ens Legis. L. Lat. A creature of the law; an artificial being, as contrasted with a natural person. Applied to corporations, considered as deriving their existence entirely from the law.” —Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, 1951.  

18.  All complaints and suits against such CORPORATION, or ens legis, fall under the aforementioned FSIA and service of process must therefore be made by the clerk of the court, under Section 1608(a)(4) of Title 28 USC, 63 Stat. 111, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2658) [42 FR 6367, Feb. 2, 1977, as amended at 63 FR 16687, Apr. 6, 1998], to the Director of the Office of Special Consular Services in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State, in Washington, D.C., exclusively, pursuant to 22 CFR §93.1 and §93.2.  A copy of the FSIA must be filed with the complaint along with “a certified copy of the diplomatic note of transmittal,” and, “the certification shall state the date and place the documents were delivered.”  The foregoing must be served upon the Chief Executive Officer and upon the Registered Agent of the designated CORPORATION or FOREIGN STATE.

19. MUNICIPAL, COUNTY, or STATE COURTS lack jurisdiction to hear any case since they fall under the definition of FOREIGN STATE, and under all related definitions below.  Said jurisdiction lies with the “district court of the United States,” established by Congress in the states under Article III of the Constitution, which are “constitutional courts” and do not include the territorial courts created under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, which are “legislative” courts. Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 21 L.Ed. 966 (1873), (See Title 28 USC, Rule 1101), exclusively, under the FSIA Statutes pursuant to 28 USC §1330.

20.  It is an undisputed, conclusive presumption that the above-mentioned real party in interest is not a CORPORATION, and, further, is not registered with any Secretary of State as a CORPORATION. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the defendant D. A., Hollister has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted to the Petitioner.  This is a FATAL DEFECT, and, therefore, the instant case and all related matters must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for lack of in personam, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction, as well as for improper Venue, as well as pursuant to the 11th amendment Foreign State Immunity.

21.  Moreover, the process in the above-captioned case is not “regular on its face.”

Regular on its Face — “Process is said to be “regular on its face” when it proceeds from the court, officer, or body having authority of law to issue process of that nature, and which is legal in form, and contains nothing to notify, or fairly apprise any one that it is issued without authority.”

TABLE OF DEFINITIONS

Foreign Court The courts of a foreign state or nation. In the United States, this term is frequently applied to the courts of one of the States when their judgment or records are introduced in the courts of another. Foreign jurisdiction Any jurisdiction foreign to that of the forum; e.g., a sister state or another country. Also, the exercise by a state or nation jurisdiction beyond its own territory. Long-arm service of process is a form of such foreign or extraterritorial jurisdiction

Foreign laws The laws of a foreign country, or of a sister state. In conflicts of law, the legal principles of jurisprudence which are part of the law of a sister state or nation. Foreign laws are additions to our own laws, and in that respect are called “jus receptum.” Foreign corporation A corporation doing business in one State though chartered or incorporated in another state is a foreign corporation as to the first state, and, as such, is required to consent to certain conditions and restrictions in order to do business in such first state. Under federal tax laws, a foreign corporation is one which is not organized under the law of one of the States or Territories of the United States. I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (5). Service of process on foreign corporation is governed by the Fed. R. Civ. P. 4  See also Corporation.

Foreign service of process Service of process for the acquisition of jurisdiction by a court in the United States upon a person in a foreign country is prescribed by Fed R. Civ. P. 4 (i) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608. Service of process on foreign corporations is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (3).

Foreign states Nations which are outside the United States. Term may also refer to another state; i.e. a sister state. Foreign immunity With respect to jurisdictional immunity of foreign states, see 28 USC, Sec. §1602 et seq. Title 8 USC, Chapter 12, Subchapter I, Sec. §1101(14) The term “foreign state” includes outlying possessions of a foreign state, but self-governing dominions or territories under mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign states.

Profiteering Taking advantage of unusual or exceptional circumstance to make excessive profit; e.g. selling of scarce or essential goods at inflated price during time of emergency or war .Person In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person) though by statute the term may include a firm, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representative, trusts, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. National Labor Relations Act, §2(1).  Definition of the term “person” under Title 26, Subtitle F, Chapter 75, Subchapter D, Sec. Sec. §7343
The term “person” as used in this chapter includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs. A corporation is a “person” within the meaning of equal protection and due process provisions of the United States Constitution. Tertius interveniens A third party intervening; a third party who comes between the parties to a suit; one who interpleads.  Gilbert’s Forum Romanum. 47. Writ of error coram nobis A common-law writ, the purpose of which is to correct a judgment in the same court in which it was rendered, on the ground of error of fact, for which it was statutes provides no other remedy, which fact did not appear of record, or was unknown to the court when judgment was pronounced, ( writ of error coram nobis was presented before judgment was made so that the error could be corrected before judgment) and which, if known would have prevented the judgment, and which was unknown, and could of reasonable  diligence in time to have been otherwise presented to the court, unless he was prevented from so presenting them by duress, fear, or other sufficient cause. “A writ of error coram nobis is a common-law writ of ancient origin devised by the judiciary, which constitutes a remedy for setting aside a judgment which for a valid reason should never have been rendered.” 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law. § 1610 (2004).”The principal function of the writ of error coram nobis is to afford to the court in which an action was tried an opportunity to correct its own record with reference to a vital fact not known when the judgment was rendered, and which could not have been presented by a motion for a new trial, appeal or other existing statutory proceeding.” Black’s Law Dictionary., 3rd ed., p. 1861; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1606 b., p. 145; Ford v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 718, 229 S.W.2d 470.At common law in England, it issued from the Court of Kings Bench to a judgment of that court. Its principal aim is to afford the court in which an action was tried an opportunity to correct its own record with reference to a vital fact not known when the judgment was rendered. It is also said that at common law it lay to correct purely ministerial errors of the officers of the court. Furthermore, the above-mentioned “real party in interest” demands the strict adherence to Article IV, section one of the National Constitution so that in all matters before this court, the Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; and to Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, still in force pursuant to Article VI of the National Constitution, so that “Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State,” selective incorporation notwithstanding.  The lex domicilii shall also depend upon the Natural Domicile of the above-mentioned “real party in interest.” The lex domicilii, involves the “law of the domicile” in the Conflict of Laws. Conflict is the branch of public law regulating all lawsuits involving a “foreign” law element where a difference in result will occur depending on which laws are applied.

DECLARATION OF STATUS AND RIGHT OF AVOIDANCE

The above-mentioned “real party in interest” hereby declares the status of a “foreign state” as defined in 28 USC 1331(b)(1), as “a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,” (in the instant case, “otherwise”), (b)(2), “an organ (a vital part) of a foreign state” and (b)(3), “neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c)” (a corporation, an insurer, or the legal representative of a decedent, an infant or an incompetent), “nor created under the laws of any third country.”    Furthermore, the above-mentioned “real party in interest” is not an artificial, corporate “person” as defined and created by PUBLIC STATUTES, and is not a juristic person which may be “affected” by PUBLIC STATUTES; but, is invested with and bears the status, condition and character of “a sovereign without subjects.”  The above-mentioned “real party in interest” is always and at all times present in his [her] “asylum home state,” which is “the common case of the place of birth, domicilium originis,” also referred to as Natural Domicile, which is “the same as domicile of origin or domicile by birth,” (See Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed.Cas. 863; Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition), which is the source and the seat of his [her] sovereignty and immunity.        Accordingly, the above-mentioned “real party in interest” exercises his [her] Right of Avoidance and hereby rejects the offered commercial venture and declines to fuse with or to animate the above-mentioned Defendant in Error, or to stand as STRAWMAN [PERSON], which is defined in Barron’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, (1996), as “a term referred to in commercial and property contexts when a transfer is made to a third party, the strawman [person], simply for the purpose of retransferring to the transferror in order to accomplish some purpose not otherwise permitted,” i.e., obtaining jurisdiction over the above-mentioned “real party in interest” or relying upon the rebuttable presumption that the above-mentioned “real party in interest” is a corporation. The definition also contains the admonition to “See dummy,” which, at that entry is therein defined as “a strawman; a sham.”  The above-mentioned party is, NOT a strawman, NOT a sham, and is certainly NOT a dummy.   This DECLARATION OF STATUS constitutes a conclusive presumption, of which the court is bound to take NOTICE, that the “real party in interest” is NOT a corporation; and, the court can exercise no jurisdiction whatsoever over the “real party in interest” or in the above-captioned case, but is duty-bound according to the due process of the law, to which the above-mentioned “real party in interest” is a belligerent claimant, and by the Rule of Law to DISMISS [OR REVERSE] it.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – PERSON

“This word ‘person’ and its scope and bearing in the law, involving, as it does, legal fictions and also apparently natural beings, it is difficult to understand; but it is absolutely necessary to grasp, at whatever cost, a true and proper understanding to the word in all the phases of its proper use . . . A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the status or condition with which he is invested . . . not an individual or physical person, but the status, condition or character borne by physical persons . . . The law of persons is the law of status or condition.” — American Law and Procedure, Vol. 13, page 137, 1910.

The following case citation declares the undisputed distinction in fact and at law of the distinction between the term “persons,” which is the plural form of the term “person,” and the word “People” which is NOT the plural form of the term “person.”  The above-mentioned “real party in interest” is NOT a subordinate “person,” “subject,” or “agent,” but is a “constituent,” in whom sovereignty abides, a member of the “Posterity of We, the People,” in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom the government has emanated: “The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of its government, but in the People, from whom the government emanated; and they may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty, then in this country, abides with the constituency, and not with the agent; and this remark is true, both in reference to the federal and state government.” (Persons are not People).–Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F 939, 943:  “Our government is founded upon compact. Sovereignty was, and is, in the people” –Glass v. Sloop Betsey, supreme Court, 1794. “People of a state are entitled to all rights which formerly belong to the King, by his prerogative.” –supreme Court, Lansing v. Smith, 1829.  “The United States, as a whole, emanates from the people … The people, in their capacity as sovereigns, made and adopted the Constitution …” –supreme Court, 4 Wheat 402. “The governments are but trustees acting under derived authority and have no power to delegate what is not delegated to them. But the people, as the original fountain might take away what they have delegated and entrust to whom they please. … The sovereignty in every state resides in the people of the state and they may alter and change their form of government at their own pleasure.” –Luther v. Borden, 48 US 1, 12 LEd 581. “While sovereign powers are delegated to … the government, sovereignty itself remains with the people”  –Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, page 370. “There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States …. In this country sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution entrusted to it: All else is withheld.” — Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421. “In common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” — Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979). “Since in common usage the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, statutes employing that term are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” — U.S. v. Cooper, 312 US 600,604, 61 SCt 742 (1941). “In common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.” — U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947). “Since in common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” — US v. Fox 94 US 315. “In common usage the word ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are generally construed to exclude the sovereign.” — U.S. v. General Motors Corporation, D.C. Ill, 2 F.R.D. 528, 530:             The following two case citations declare the undisputed doctrine, in fact and at law, that the word (term of art) “person” is a “general word,” and that the “people,” of whom the above-mentioned “real party in interest” is one, “are NOT bound by general words in statutes.”  Therefore, statutes do not apply to, operate upon or affect the above-mentioned “real party in interest:” “The word `person’ in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings., –Church of Scientology v. US Department of Justice 612 F2d 417, 425 (1979).  “The people, or sovereign are not bound by general words in statutes, restrictive of prerogative right, title or interest, unless expressly named. Acts of limitation do not bind the King or the people. The people have been ceded all the rights of the King, the former sovereign … It is a maxim of the common law, that when an act is made for the common good and to prevent injury, the King shall be bound, though not named, but when a statute is general and prerogative right would be divested or taken from the King (or the People) he shall not be bound.” — The People v. Herkimer, 4 Cowen (NY) 345, 348 (1825): “In the United States, sovereignty resides in people.” –Perry v. U.S. (294 US 330). “A Sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal Right as against the authority that makes the law on which the Right depends.” –Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, 27 S. Ct. 526, 527, 51 L. Ed. 834 (1907).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

In a court of limited jurisdiction, whenever a party denies that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it becomes the duty and the burden of the party claiming that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to provide evidence from the record of the case that the court holds subject-matter jurisdiction. Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) (“the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it.”).  Until the plaintiff submits uncontroversial evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction to the court that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the court is proceeding without subject-matter jurisdiction. Loos v American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841(1988)(“Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the plaintiff.”).  The law places the duty and burden of subject-matter jurisdiction upon the plaintiff.  Should the court attempt to place the burden upon the defendant, the court has acted against the law, violates the defendant’s due process rights, and the judge under court decisions has immediately lost subject-matter jurisdiction. In a court of limited jurisdiction, the court must proceed exactly according to the law or statute under which it operates. Flake v Pretzel, 381 Ill. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943) (“the actions, being statutory proceedings, …were void for want of power to make them.”) (“The judgments were based on orders which were void because the court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering them. Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction of a subject matter, as here, transcends the limits of the jurisdiction conferred, its judgment is void.”); Armstrong v Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921) (“The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs and does not transcend in the extent and character of its judgment or decree the law or statute which is applicable to it.” In Interest of M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300, 681 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1997) (“Where a court’s power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, and courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the strictures of the statute.”); In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill.App.3d 813, 557 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1990) (“The jurisdiction of a court in a dissolution proceeding is limited to that conferred by statute.”); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Const. Co., Inc., 101 Ill.App.3d 30, 40, 427 N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1981) (“Though a court be one of general jurisdiction, when its power to act on a particular matter is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction.”). “There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.” Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.  “A universal principle as old as the law is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property.” Norwood v. Renfield, 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini, 49 P. 732.  “Jurisdiction is fundamental and a judgment rendered by a court that does not have jurisdiction to hear is void ab initio.” In Re Application of Wyatt, 300 P. 132; Re Cavitt, 118 P2d 846.  “Thus, where a judicial tribunal has no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes to act, its proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense of the term.” Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P 27.  “A court has no jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, for a basic issue in any case before a tribunal is its power to act, and a court must have the authority to decide that question in the first instance.” Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 171 P2d 8; 331  US 549, 91 L. ed. 1666, 67 S.Ct. 1409.  “A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction.” Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937.  “Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of juris.” Merritt v. Hunter, C.A.Kansas 170 F2d 739. “the fact that the petitioner was released on a promise to appear before a magistrate for an arraignment, that fact is circumstance to be considered in determining whether in first instance there was a probable cause for the arrest.” Monroe v. Papa, DC, Ill. 1963, 221 F Supp 685. “Jurisdiction, once challenged, is to be proven, not by the court, but by the party attempting to assert jurisdiction. The burden of proof of jurisdiction lies with the asserter.”  See McNutt v. GMAC, 298 US 178. The origins of this doctrine of law may be found in Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 US 308. “A court has no jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, for a basic issue in any case before a tribunal is its power to act, and a court must have the authority to decide that question in the first instance.” Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 171 P2d 8; 331 US 549, 91 L. ed. 1666, 67 S.Ct. 1409. “Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action.” Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026.  “The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven.” –Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). “Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.” –Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533.  “Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct collateral attack.” –Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 381; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471.

“No sanctions can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.” –Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768; Title 5 U.S.C., Sec. 556 and 558 (b).

“The proponent of the rule has the burden of proof.” –Title 5 U.S.C., Sec. 556 (d). “Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination.” –Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910.  “Mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished.” –Owens v. The City of Independence, “A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction.” –Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937.  “In a court of limited jurisdiction, whenever a party denies that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it becomes the duty and the burden of the party claiming that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to provide evidence from the record of the case that the court holds subject-matter jurisdiction.”  –Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) (“the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it.”).  “Until the plaintiff submits uncontroversial evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction to the court that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the court is proceeding without subject-matter jurisdiction.”–Loos v American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841(1988)(“Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the plaintiff.”).  The law places the duty and burden of subject-matter jurisdiction upon the plaintiff. Should the court attempt to place the burden upon the defendant, the court has acted against the law, violates the defendant’s due process rights, and the judge under court decisions has immediately lost subject-matter jurisdiction. In a court of limited jurisdiction, the court must proceed exactly according to the law or statute under which it operates. –Flake v Pretzel, 381 Ill. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943) (“the actions, being statutory proceedings, …were void for want of power to make them.”) (“The judgments were based on orders which were void because the court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering them. Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction of a subject matter, as here, transcends the limits of the jurisdiction conferred, its judgment is void.”); Armstrong v Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921) “The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs and does not transcend in the extent and character of its judgment or decree the law or statute which is applicable to it.” In Interest of M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300, 681 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1997) (“Where a court’s power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, and courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the strictures of the statute.”); In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill.App.3d 813, 557 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1990) (“The jurisdiction of a court in a dissolution proceeding is limited to that conferred by statute.”); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Const. Co., Inc., 101 Ill.App.3d 30, 40, 427 N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1981) (“Though a court be one of general jurisdiction, when its power to act on a particular matter is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction.”).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – LACK OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

Thus, neither Judges nor Government attorneys are above the law. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F. 2d 1124, 1143 (7th Cir. 1974). In our judicial system, few more serious threats to individual liberty can be imagined than a corrupt judge or judges acting in collusion outside of their judicial authority with the Executive Branch to deprive a citizen of his rights. In The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613), Sir Edward Coke found that Article 39 of the Magna Carta restricted the power of judges to act outside of their jurisdiction such proceedings would be void, and actionable.
When a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is before a person who is not a judge, and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . . Id. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038-41.

A majority of states including Virginia (see, Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3)), followed the English rule to find that a judge had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction. Robert Craig Waters, ‘Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983′ 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and 29-30).

Also as early as 1806, in the United States there were recognized restrictions on the power of judges, as well as the placing of liability on judges for acts outside of their jurisdiction. In Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806), the Supreme Court confirmed the right to sue a judge for exercising authority beyond the jurisdiction authorized by statute.

In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 at 360 (1978), the Supreme Court confirmed that a judge would be immune from suit only if he did not act outside of his judicial capacity and/or was not performing any act expressly prohibited by statute. See Block, Stump v Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 4980 Duke L.J. 879 (l980). The Circuit Court overturned this case and the judge was liable.

Judicial immunity may only extend to all judicial acts within the court’s jurisdiction and judicial capacity, but it does not extend to either criminal acts, or acts outside of official capacity or in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ see Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 349 (1978).  “When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid Constitutional provisions or valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction or judicial capacity, judicial immunity is lost.” –Rankin v. Howard 633 F.2d 844 (1980), Den Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020 (1981).
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872), ‘where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.’ The constitutional requirement of due process of the law is indispensable:”No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived or life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”  Article V, National Constitution. “A judgment can be void . . . where the court acts in a manner contrary to due process.”  –Am Jur 2d, §29 Void Judgments, p. 404. “Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of juris.” –Merritt v. Hunter, C.A.Kansas 170 F2d 739. “Moreover, all proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid.”  –Olson v. Leith 71 Wyo. 316, 257 P.2d 342. “In criminal cases, certain constitutional errors require automatic reversal,” see State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1966).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – RECIPROCAL IMMUNITY AND FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IMMUNITIES ACT,
PUBLIC LAW 79-291, 29 DECEMBER 1945(Public Law 291-79th Congress) TITLE I Section 2.(b) International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of Judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract. (d) In so far as concerns customs duties and internal-revenue taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation, and the procedures in connexion therewith; the registration of foreign agents; and the treatment of official communications, the privileges, exemptions, and immunities to which international organizations shall be entitled shall be those accorded under similar circumstances to foreign governments. Section 9. The privileges, exemptions, and immunities of international organizations and of their officers and employees, and members of their families, suites, and servants, provided for in this title, shall be granted notwithstanding the fact that the similar privileges, exemptions, and immunities granted to a foreign government, its officers, or employees, may be conditioned upon the existence of reciprocity by that foreign government: Provided, That nothing contained in this title shall be construed as precluding the Secretary of State from withdrawing the privileges exemptions, and immunities herein provided from persons who are nationals of any foreign country on the ground that such country is failing to accord corresponding privileges, exemptions, and immunities to citizens of the United States. Also see 22 USC § 611 – FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE; and, 22 USC § 612, Registration statement, concerning the absolute requirement of registration with the Attorney General as a “foreign principal,” due to the undisputed status of the court and its alleged officers and employees as FOREIGN AGENTS, described supra. This requirement shall be deemed to include, but is not limited to, an affidavit of non-communist association.

CONCLUSION AND RECTUM ROGARE

WHEREAS, the facts and the law contained herein are before this court; and; WHEREAS, the facts and the law contained herein are the Truth; and WHEREAS, we hold said Truths to be self-evident; and, WHEREAS, self-evident Truths are undisputed and incontrovertible, no oral argument is requested, for no words can alter or overcome these Truths; and, WHEREAS, Truth is Sovereign: She comes from God and bears His message, from whatever quarter her great eyes may look down upon you; Psalms 117:2; John 8:32; II Corinthians. 13:8; THEREFORE; this court must perform its duty under the Rule of Law, do Justice, Rectum Rogare, and DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE [OR REVERSE] the above-captioned case without delay for “Justice delayed is Justice denied.”   Rectum Rogare – “to do right; to petition the judge to do right.” –Black’s Law Dictionary 4th edition.

AMENDATORY RECONSTRUCTION ACT OF MARCH 11, 1868

An Act to amend the act passed March 23, 1867, entitled “An Act supplementary to ‘An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel states,’ passed March 2, 1867, and to facilitate their restoration. SUPPLEMENTARY RECONSTRUCTION ACT OF FORTIETH CONGRESS. An Act supplementary to an act entitled “An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel states,” passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and to facilitate restoration. This act created the 14th amendment federal citizen under section 3 of the federal constitution. All who hold public office fall under this section as UNITED STATES citizens. Those who hold office have knowingly and willingly given up their citizenship to this country under Title 8 Section §1481 to become a foreign state agent under 22 USC.          The oath of office to the constitution requires office-holders to uphold and maintain our Constitutional form of government under the people’s authority. This right was never surrendered by the people; failure to do so violates 10 USC §333 and 18 USC §1918, chapter 115 §2382, §2383, §1505, §1001, §241, §242, 42 USC §1981 & 31 USC §3729 just to name a few.

The Federal Debt Collection Procedure places all courts under equity and commerce and under the International Monetary Fund. The International Monetary Fund comes under the Uniform Commercial Code under banking and business interest and Trust laws. This makes the Court / Judges trustee over the trust and responsible whether or not the Petitioner understands the trust issue.  The 1933 bankruptcy act placed all public officials in a fiduciary position to write off the public debt, since this Nation is not solvent. The TWEA suspended the U.S. Constitution in the court room, and therefore, the standard American flag in the courtroom was replaced with a military Admiralty flag for dealing with alien enemy residents. The people never rescinded their nationality to the real united States of America. Those who hold public office rescinded their nationality to become a foreign agent in order to hold public office.  International law requires the judge to uphold the people’s Constitutional form of government as defined in the “Federalist Papers”.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure / Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 2 only allows civil action, and under Rule 17, a real party of interest has to be present in the courtroom in order for there to be any claims of injury or damages against “the people.”  Any charges under the “UNITED STATES” or “THE STATE OF……..”  fall under the TWEA Section 23.  The people are not subject to this jurisdiction as it is a Foreign State jurisdiction. The people hold 11th amendment immunity to claims in equity and commerce from a foreign state. The courts lack jurisdiction over the Petitioner by Congressional mandate. For the aforestated reasons, the Plaintiff / Court lacks jurisdiction under Rule 4(j) & 12(b) (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) over this Petitioner.

The Petitioner now demands this Court to dismiss this matter WITH PREJUDICE.

Adversarial System;

Mack vs. City of Detroit, Chief Justice Cavanagh, No. 118468, 2002.

“The adversarial system ensures the best presentation of arguments and theories because each party is motivated to succeed. Moreover, the adversarial system attempts to ensure that an active judge refrain from allowing a preliminary understanding of the issues to improperly influence the final decision. This allows the judiciary to keep an open mind until the proofs and arguments have been adequately submitted. In spite of these underlying concerns, the majority today claims that the benefits of full briefing are simply a formality that can be discarded without care. The majority fails to comprehend how the skilled advocates in this case could have added anything insightful in the debate over the proper interpretation of a century’s worth of precedent. Whatever its motivation, the majority undermines the foundations of our adversarial system.

The Petitioner is covered under Title 18 § 4 Misprision of felony & Title 31 USC §3729 False Claims as Whistle-blowers.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 1 > § 4 Misprision of felony

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

TITLE 31 > SUBTITLE III > CHAPTER 37 > SUBCHAPTER III
§3729. False claims(a) Liability for Certain Acts.— Any person who— (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; (3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid;  TITLE 31 > SUBTITLE III > CHAPTER 37 > SUBCHAPTER III

§3730 Civil actions for false claims(b) Actions by Private Persons.— (1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting

These are the laws as we know them—clear, precise and written by those with superior knowledge of the law “LAWYERS”, not the people. The people can not be held accountable if there is a failure to clarify or if its “incomprehensible, baseless assertions and citations to disjointed and/or irrelevant legal authority, grammatically, logically and legally incomprehensible, frivolous and unintelligible” or a conflict in the laws. This then goes back to those “LAWYERS” who created this conflict in law to be held accountable.

DEFAMATION

Any intentional false communication, either written or spoken, that harms a person’s reputation; decreases the respect, regard, or confidence in which a person is held; or induces disparaging, hostile, or disagreeable opinions or feelings against a person.

Defamation may be a criminal or civil charge. It encompasses both written statements, known as libel, and spoken statements, called slander.

The probability that a plaintiff will recover damages in a defamation suit depends largely on whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure in the eyes of the law. The public figure law of defamation was first delineated in new york times v. sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). In Sullivan, the plaintiff, a police official, claimed that false allegations about him appeared in the New York Times, and sued the newspaper for libel. The Supreme Court balanced the plaintiff’s interest in preserving his reputation against the public’s interest in freedom of expression in the area of political debate. It held that a public official alleging libel must prove actual malice in order to recover damages. The Court declared that the First Amendment protects open and robust debate on public issues even when such debate includes “vehement, caustic, unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” A public official or other plaintiff who has voluntarily assumed a position in the public eye must prove that defamatory statements were made with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false.

1. The Plaintiff was defamed by the defendant’s sheriff’s office and or defendant D. A., Hollister who released the story in the defendants Feather River Publishing newspaper and on line Plumas County News,Seven arrested on methamphetamine  related charges by Dan McDonald Managing Editor 3/28/2013; http://www.plumasnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10792:seven-arrested-on-methamphetamine-related-charges&catid=69:-headline-news&Itemid=6

2. on 24th July 2013, the defendant D. A., Hollister broke his own and the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman’s gag order with Conspiracy and the help of the town paper defendants Feather River Publishing released a story about Plaintiff. “Man Facing Drug Charges Tests Court’s Patience before Trial” (see Feather River Bulletin dated 24th July 2013) and it is full of lies and discrepancies

INVASION OF PRIVACY 4TH AMENDMENT

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has four elements: (1) the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct must be extreme and outrageous; and (3) the conduct must be the cause (4) of severe emotional distress.

NON CORPORATE ENTITY NON SLAVE OWNER

NON SLAVE OWNER UNDER THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT SEPTEMBER 18, 1850

NON SLAVE OWNER UNDER THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT SEPTEMBER 18, 1850, pursuant to FRCP Rule 17 interested party; non slave owner and this Court jurisdiction lies under FRCP 4 (j)

This Court is defined under FRCP Rule 4 (j) as a FOREIGN STATE as purported in and defined under 28 USC §1602 -1611 FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT (FSIA), By this administrative offices stepping-outside-of slave ownership along with your corporate officers under 28 USC 1608, they are stepping into a foreign statestatus. Your officers now come under the Emergency War Powers Act and Trading with the Enemy Act clauses and causes you to be subject to the UCMJ under Title 10 USC and your officers are in violation of HR 1955 and HR 3162, causing them and this Administrative hearing board to be subject to domestic terrorism and to be defined in a NOTICE OF FELONY against such officers and this Administrative board.

It is also an undisputed, conclusive presumption that the accusers are making allegations that I am or have been a slave owner or slave trader. By the Administrative office, the Accusers who are misusing my name, address, EIN / SS number and the DOB, are now conspiring in a fraudulent act under The Fugitive Slave Act, September 18, 1850. By such acts this Administrative Office and the Accusers are in violation of The Emergency War Powers Act( EWPA) and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TEA). The accusers are either refusing to support their claims of slave ownership or can not support their fraudulent allegations before any administrative hearing boards. Such accusers will be required to prove so. Absent such chattle agreement between this defendant and the accusers all allegations must fail under the disguise of Master/ servant relationship. There are Two frauds being placed by the accusers before this administrative hearing board and a third fraud is being added upon the America Citizens; 1) the fact that we are a slave owner, 2) The fact that we are by definition a corporation and 3) The fact that this administrative hearing is operating in a foreign state jurisdiction that comes under EWPA and TEA making it an International incident.

“In all of these laws it is laid down that the child follows the condition of the mother, whomever.” “ All their issue and their offspring, born or to be born, shall be, and are hereby declared to be, and remain FOR EVER HEREAFTER, absolute slaves, and shall follow the condition of the mother.”

“In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence.”

(Jay’s Inquiry, p. 129. See Act of 1740. 2 Brevard’s Digest, 229.)  Similar in Georgia. (Prince’s Dig., 446. Act of 1770.) And in Mississippi. (Revised Code of 1823, p. 369.) And in Virginia. (Revised Code of 1819, p. 421.) And in Kentucky. (Littell and Swigert’s Digest, 1149-50.) And in Louisiana. (Civil Code, art. 183.)

The follow acts have been repealed or are still in effect that has direct effect as purported in the above case law.

Repealed Feb 20, 1820 entire act An act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery Birth Certificate Feb.15, 1804, Acts 28th G.A. 2nd sitting, ch.CIII, p.251-254.

Repealed March 6, 1806 section 3; “every child so abandoned shall be maintained by such person until such child arrives to the age of one year, and thereafter shall be considered as a pauper of such township or county. “

Still in effect after 1846 act

Supplement to an act, entitled ‘An act for the settlement and relief of the poor [Mar.11,1774],’ June 10, 1820, §§6-8, Public Acts 44th G.A. [3rd sitting], p.166, 168-169; Penn. 763,765; Elm.Dig. “Poor” §§34-36, p.416-417. Included in “An Act for the settlement and relief of the poor,” revision approved April 10, 1846, §§29-31, Revision of 1846, Title XXXII, ch.1, p.877, 892; Nix.Dig. 1855 p.614-615; Nix.Dig. 1868 p.714-715; and revision approved March 27, 1874, §§33-35, Revision of 1877, p.844; General Statutes 1895, p.2511; Compiled Statutes 1910, p.4025. (Repealed by P.L.1930, c.37, p.93,171.)

(Edward Mandell House had this to say in a private meeting with Woodrow Wilson (President) 1913-1921)

“Every American will be forced to register or suffer not being able to work and earn a living.  They will be our chattel, and we will hold the security interest over them forever, by operation of the law merchant under the scheme of secured transactions.  Americans, by unknowingly or unwittingly delivering the bills of lading to us will be rendered bankrupt and insolvent, forever to remain economic slaves through taxation, secured by their pledges.  They will be stripped of their rights and given a commercial value designed to make us a profit and they will be none the wiser, for not one man in a million could ever figure our plans and, if by accident one or two would figure it out, we have in our arsenal plausible deniability. 

We will employ the high office of the President of our dummy corporation to foment this plot against America.”

With the Congressional document known as an Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery 1850s and the above purported case laws that show that a mother passes on the so call slave ownership from children to children as defined by Edward Mandell House’ statements. This goes to show the true intent of the accusers to defraud not only this America Citizen but every America Citizen that comes before such Administrative hearing board. The accusers are misrepresenting the nature of the crime through the use of false allegations and other fraudulent statements in order to defraud this Party. By misusing the true terms of the English language by this fraud and deceit and misrepresentation of the language, the accusers are in violation of The Emergency War Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act before this administrative hearing board. The people of this nation has been told and allowed to be believe slavery has been abolished , but yet the accusers are misusing an act that has been repealed in 1820 in order to enslave this party and all others who appear before these administrative hearing boards.

As an America Citizen I hold the inherent right of the 11th amendment immunity. The judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted by a Foreign State. If this FOREIGN STATE is misusing the name of this America Citizen by claims of slave ownership or placing it in all caps or misusing the last name or using the term “person” as a CORPORATION all complaints and suits against such CORPORATION fall under the FSIA and the DEPT OF STATE OFFICES in Washington DC. DC now has to be notified pursuant to 22 CFR 93.1 -93.2.A copy of the FSIA has to be filed with the complaint to the defendant’s chief executive officer of such CORPORATION.

MUNICIPAL, COUNTY, OR STATE COURTS lack jurisdiction to hear any case under the FOREIGN STATE definitions. This jurisdiction lies with the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT under the FSIA Statutes pursuant to 28 USC 1330.

Because the Defendant is a non corporate entity and not a slave owner nor registered with any Secretary of State as a CORPORATION the Accuser has FAILED to state a claim to which relief can be granted under 12(b) (6). This matter must be dismissed for lack of political, personam, and subject matter jurisdiction and venue as applied to the America citizen as not being subject to a foreign state under the 11th amendment.

Definitions

 BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY FIFTH EDITION

Corpus Juris SecundumThe Body of Law” or Legal encyclopedia, Volume 7, Section 4: as quoted:

“Attorney & client: An Attorney’s “first” duty is to the Courts (1st) and the public (2nd) and not to the client (3rd), and wherever the duties to an attorney’s  client “conflict” with those interests that he/she owes his allegiance to, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the latter“. The Biggest problem today is that People do not know their own rights & blindly entrust their rights to someone else.

Foreign Court:

The courts of a foreign state or nation. In the United States, this term is frequently applied to the courts of one of the states when their judgment or records are introduced in the courts of another.

Foreign jurisdiction:

Any jurisdiction foreign to that of the forum; e.g. a sister state or another country. Also the exercise by a state or nation jurisdiction beyond its own territory. Long – arm

Service of process is a form of such foreign or extraterritorial jurisdiction

Foreign laws:

The laws of a foreign country, or of a sister state. In conflict of law, the legal principle of jurisprudence which are part of the law of a sister state or nation. Foreign laws are additions to our own laws, and in that respect are called “jus receptum”

Foreign corporation:

A corporation doing business in one state though chartered or incorporated in another state is a foreign corporation as to the first state, and, as such, is required to consent to certain conditions and restriction in order to do business in such first state. Under federal tax laws, a foreign corporation is one which is not organized under the law of one of the states or territories of the United States. I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (5). Service of process on foreign corporation is governed by the Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 See also Corporation

TITLE 26 – INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, Subtitle F – Procedure and Administration ,CHAPTER 79 – DEFINITIONS Sec. 7701. Definitions  (5) Foreign The term “foreign” when applied to a corporation or partnership means a corporation or partnership which is not domestic.”

Foreign service of process:

Service of process for the acquisition of jurisdiction by a court in the United States upon a person in a foreign country is prescribed by Fed R. Civ. P. 4 (i) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608. Service of process on foreign corporation is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (3)

Foreign states:

Nations which are outside the United States. Term may also refer to another state; i.e. a sister state.

Foreign immunity:

With respect to jurisdiction immunity of foreign nation, see 28 U.S.C.A 1602 et seq.

Profiteering:

Taking advantage of unusual or exceptional circumstance to make excessive profit; e.g. selling of scarce or essential goods at inflated price during time of emergency or war.

Person:

In general usage, a human being (i.e. nature person) thought by statute term may include a firm, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, ,legal representative, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy ,or receivers. National Labor Relations act, §2(1).

A corporation is a” person” within meaning of equal protection and due process provisions of United States Constitution.

Writ of error Coram Nobis:

A common-law writ, the purpose of which is to correct a judgment in the same court in which it was rendered, on the ground of error of fact, for which it was statutes provides no other remedy, which fact did not appear of record, or was unknown to the court when judgment was pronounced, and which ,if known would have prevented the judgment, and which was unknown, and could of reasonable diligence in time to have been otherwise presented to the court, unless he was prevented from so presenting them by duress, fear, or other sufficient cause.

At common law in England, it issued from the Court of Kings Bench to a judgment of that court. Its principal aim is to afford the court in which an action was tried and opportunity to correct it own record with reference to a vital fact not known when the judgment was rendered. It is also said that at common law

It lay to correct purely ministerial errors of the officers of the court

VIOLATIONS TITLE 18 USC

EXTORTION:

USCTitle 18Part IChapter 41 › § 872

18 USC § 872 – Extortion by officers or employees of the United States

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

Whoever, being an officer, or employee of the United States or any department or agency thereof, or representing himself to be or assuming to act as such, under color or pretense

of office or employment commits or attempts an act of extortion, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; but if the amount so extorted or demanded does not exceed $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

We exercise our copyright to benefit the people of California,” said Linda Brown, State of California deputy director of the Office of Administrative Law, which manages the state’s laws. “We are obtaining compensation for the people of California.”In other words, we hide the laws you have to obey from you in order to get more money into the state’s coffers.” http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080904/0433382169.shtml

Sounds like EXTORTION to me!

KIDNAPPING:

 USCTitle 18Part IChapter 55 › § 1201

18 USC § 1201 – Kidnapping

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when—

(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of whether the person was alive when transported across a State boundary, or the offender travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense;

(2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States;

(3) any such act against the person is done within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 46501 of title 49;

(4) the person is a foreign official, an internationally protected person, or an official guest as those terms are defined in section 1116 (b) of this title; or

(5) the person is among those officers and employees described in section 1114 of this title and any such act against the person is done while the person is engaged in, or on account of, the performance of official duties,

shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment.

(b) With respect to subsection (a)(1), above, the failure to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away shall create a rebuttable presumption that such person has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the fact that the presumption under this section has not yet taken effect does not preclude a Federal investigation of a possible violation of this section before the 24-hour period has ended.

(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

(d) Whoever attempts to violate subsection (a) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.

(e) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally protected person outside the United States, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if

(1) the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States,

(2) an offender is a national of the United States, or

(3) an offender is afterwards found in the United States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including any of the places within the provisions of sections 5 and 7 of this title and section 46501 (2) of title 49. For purposes of this subsection, the term “national of the United States” has the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(22)).

(f) In the course of enforcement of subsection (a)(4) and any other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to violate subsection (a)(4), the Attorney General may request assistance from any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding.

(g) Special Rule for Certain Offenses Involving Children.—

(1) To whom applicable.— If—

(A) the victim of an offense under this section has not attained the age of eighteen years; and

(B) the offender—

(i) has attained such age; and

(ii) is not—

(I) a parent;

(II) a grandparent;

(III) a brother;

(IV) a sister;

(V) an aunt;

(VI) an uncle; or

(VII) an individual having legal custody of the victim;

the sentence under this section for such offense shall include imprisonment for not less than 20 years.

[(2) Repealed. Pub. L. 108–21, title I, § 104(b),Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 653.]

(h) As used in this section, the term “parent” does not include a person whose parental rights with respect to the victim of an offense under this section have been terminated by a final court order.

RANSOM

 -                      USCTitle 18Part IChapter 55 › § 1202

18 USC § 1202 – Ransom money

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

(a) Whoever receives, possesses, or disposes of any money or other property, or any portion thereof, which has at any time been delivered as ransom or reward in connection with a violation of section 1201 of this title, knowing the same to be money or property which has been at any time delivered as such ransom or reward, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

(b) A person who transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any proceeds of a kidnapping punishable under State law by imprisonment for more than 1 year, or receives, possesses, conceals, or disposes of any such proceeds after they have crossed a State or United States boundary, knowing the proceeds to have been unlawfully obtained, shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined under this title, or both.

(c) For purposes of this section, the term “State” has the meaning set forth in section 245 (d) of this title.

TREASON

USCTitle 18Part IChapter 115 › § 2381

18 USC § 2381 – Treason

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

MISPRISION OF TREASON

USCTitle 18Part IChapter 115 › § 2382

18 USC § 2382 – Misprision of treason

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.

REBELLION OR INSURRECTION

USCTitle 18Part IChapter 115 › § 2383

18 USC § 2383 – Rebellion or insurrection

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY

USCTitle 18Part IChapter 115 › § 2384

18 USC § 2384 – Seditious conspiracy

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

ADVOCATING OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENT

USCTitle 18Part IChapter 115 › § 2385

18 USC § 2385 – Advocating overthrow of Government

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or

Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or

Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof—

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.

As used in this section, the terms “organizes” and “organize”, with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of persons.

VIOLATION OF TITLE 28 USC

 COURTS ALWAYS OPEN 

USCTitle 28Part IChapter 21 › § 452

28 USC § 452 – Courts always open; powers unrestricted by expiration of sessions

Source

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 907; Pub. L. 88–139, § 2,Oct. 16, 1963, 77 Stat. 248.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 13 and 302 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 9, 189,36 Stat. 1088, 1143; Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 1,45 Stat. 1475).

Sections 13 and 302 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., related only to district courts and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and this section has been written to cover all other courts of the United States.

Other provisions of said section 302 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., are incorporated in sections 214, 456, and 604 of this title.

The phrase “always open” means “never closed” and signifies the time when a court can exercise its functions. With respect to matters enumerated by statute or rule as to which the court is “always open,” there is no time when the court is without power to act. (Ex parte Branch, 63 Ala. 383, 387.)

Section 13 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., provided that “The district courts, as courts of *” * * admiralty and as courts of equity, shall be deemed always open for enumerated purposes, and that the judge “at chambers or in the clerk’s office, and in vacation as well as in term,” may make orders and issue process. The revised section omits all reference to the nature of the action or proceeding and enumeration of the acts which may be performed by the court. This is in accord with Rules 45(c) and 56 of the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which contain similar provisions with respect to criminal procedure both in the courts of appeals and in the district courts.

Rules 6(c) and 77(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain provisions similar to the second and first paragraphs, respectively, of this section with respect to civil actions in district courts.

Amendments

1963—Pub. L. 88–139substituted “expiration of sessions” for “terms” in section catchline, and “session” for “term” in text.

OATHS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES

28 USC § 453 – Oaths of justices and judges

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: “I, XXX XXX, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as XXX under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”

PRACTICE OF LAW BY JUSTICES AND JUDGES

 USCTitle 28Part IChapter 21 › § 454

28 USC § 454 – Practice of law by justices and judges

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

Any justice or judge appointed under the authority of the United States who engages in the practice of law is guilty of a high misdemeanor.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/454

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUSTICE, JUDGE, OR MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 USCTitle 28Part IChapter 21 › § 455

28 USC § 455 – Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.

(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning indicated:

(1) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation;

(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;

(3) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;

(4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization;

(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;

(iv) Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities.

(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.

(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.

VIOLATION OF TITLE 42 USC

 CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS

USCTitle 42Chapter 21Subchapter I › § 1985

42 USC § 1985 – Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

ACTION FOR NEGLECT TO PREVENT

USCTitle 42Chapter 21Subchapter I › § 1986

42 USC § 1986 – Action for neglect to prevent

Current through Pub. L. 113-21.

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.

VIOLATION OF 11TH AMENDMENT

      As an America Citizen, I hold the inherent right of the 11th Amendment. “The judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted by a ForeignState.” If this FOREIGN STATE is misusing the name of this America Citizen by placing it in all caps or misusing the last name or using the term “person” as a CORPORATION, all complaints and suits against such CORPORATION fall under the FSIA and the DEPT OF STATE OFFICES in Washington DC. DC had to be notified pursuant to 22 CFR 93.1-93.2. This procedure was not followed by the Plaintiff(s). A copy of the FSIA has to be filed with the complaint to the Defendant’s agent and the chief executive officer of that CORPORATION.

Any MUNICIPAL, COUNTY, OR STATE COURT lacks jurisdiction to hear any case under the FOREIGN STATE def initions. This jurisdiction lies with the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT under the FSIA Statutes pursuant to 28 USC sec. 1330.

VIOLATION OF NON-CORPORATE ENTITY

Because the Defendant is a non-corporate entity, and is not registered with any

Secretary of State as a CORPORATION, the Prosecution has FAILED to state a claim to which relief can be granted under 12(b) (6). Therefore this matter must be dismissed for lack of political, personam, subject matter jurisdiction, and Venue under the 11th Amendment.

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE FSIA ACT 1976

Court is defined under FRCP Rule 4 (j) as a FOREIGN STATE as defined under 28 USC, CHAPTER 97—JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES, Sec. 1602 -1611. The FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT (FSIA) allows the petitioner to challenge jurisdiction, therefore full disclosure of the true jurisdiction of this Court is now being demanded.  Motion # 3: A WRIT OF ERROR, CORAM NOBIS, AND A DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE PROPER  JURISDICTION AND

VENUE  

Rule 60. Relief from a Judgment or Order

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(a) Corrections Based on Clerical Mistakes; Oversights and Omissions. The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice. But after an appeal has been docketed in the appellate court and while it is pending, such a mistake may be corrected only with the appellate court’s leave.

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

(c) Timing and Effect of the Motion.

(1) Timing. A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.

(2) Effect on Finality. The motion does not affect the judgment’s finality or suspend its operation.

(d) Other Powers to Grant Relief. This rule does not limit a court’s power to:

(1) Entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding;

(2) grant relief under 28 U.S.C. §1655 to a defendant who was not personally notified of the action; or

(3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.

(e) Bills and Writs Abolished. The following are abolished: bills of review, bills in the nature of bills of review, and writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, and audita querela.

Notes

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1937

Note to Subdivision (a). See [former] Equity Rule 72 (Correction of Clerical Mistakes in Orders and Decrees); Mich.Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 48, §3; 2 Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Remington, 1932) §464(3); Wyo.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Courtright, 1931) §89–2301(3). For an example of a very liberal provision for the correction of clerical errors and for amendment after judgment, see Va.Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) §§6329, 6333.

Note to Subdivision (b). Application to the court under this subdivision does not extend the time for taking an appeal, as distinguished from the motion for new trial. This section is based upon Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) §473. See also N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) §108; 2 Minn.Stat. (Mason, 1927) §9283.

For the independent action to relieve against mistake, etc., see Dobie, Federal Procedure, pages 760–765, compare 639; and Simkins, Federal Practice, ch. CXXI (pp. 820–830) and ch. CXXII (pp. 831–834), compare §214.

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1946 Amendment

Subdivision (a). The amendment incorporates the view expressed in Perlman v. 322 West Seventy-Second Street Co., Inc. (C.C.A.2d, 1942) 127 F.(2d) 716; 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (1938) 3276, and further permits correction after docketing, with leave of the appellate court. Some courts have thought that upon the taking of an appeal the district court lost its power to act. See Schram v. Safety Investment Co. (E.D.Mich. 1942) 45 F.Supp. 636; also Miller v. United States (C.C.A.7th, 1940) 114 F.(2d) 267.

Subdivision (b). When promulgated, the rules contained a number of provisions, including those found in Rule 60(b), describing the practice by a motion to obtain relief from judgments, and these rules, coupled with the reservation in Rule 60(b) of the right to entertain a new action to relieve a party from a judgment, were generally supposed to cover the field. Since the rules have been in force, decisions have been rendered that the use of bills of review, coram nobis, or audita querela, to obtain relief from final judgments is still proper, and that various remedies of this kind still exist although they are not mentioned in the rules and the practice is not prescribed in the rules. It is obvious that the rules should be complete in this respect and define the practice with respect to any existing rights or remedies to obtain relief from final judgments. For extended discussion of the old common law writs and equitable remedies, the interpretation of Rule 60, and proposals for change, see Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623. See also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (1938) 3254 et seq.; Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of Relief From Judgment (1941) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 942, 945; Wallace v. United States (C.C.A.2d, 1944) 142 F.(2d) 240, cert. den. (1944) 323 U.S. 712.

The reconstruction of Rule 60(b) has for one of its purposes a clarification of this situation. Two types of procedure to obtain relief from judgments are specified in the rules as it is proposed to amend them. One procedure is by motion in the court and in the action in which the judgment was rendered. The other procedure is by a new or independent action to obtain relief from a judgment, which action may or may not be begun in the court which rendered the judgment. Various rules, such as the one dealing with a motion for new trial and for amendment of judgments, Rule 59, one for amended findings, Rule 52, and one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Rule 50(b), and including the provisions of Rule 60(b) as amended, prescribe the various types of cases in which the practice by motion is permitted. In each case there is a limit upon the time within which resort to a motion is permitted, and this time limit may not be enlarged under Rule 6(b). If the right to make a motion is lost by the expiration of the time limits fixed in these rules, the only other procedural remedy is by a new or independent action to set aside a judgment upon those principles which have heretofore been applied in such an action. Where the independent action is resorted to, the limitations of time are those of laches or statutes of limitations. The Committee has endeavored to ascertain all the remedies and types of relief heretofore available by coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, bill of review, or bill in the nature of a bill of review. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623, 659–682. It endeavored then to amend the rules to permit, either by motion or by independent action, the granting of various kinds of relief from judgments which were permitted in the federal courts prior to the adoption of these rules, and the amendment concludes with a provision abolishing the use of bills of review and the other common law writs referred to, and requiring the practice to be by motion or by independent action.

To illustrate the operation of the amendment, it will be noted that under Rule 59(b) as it now stands, without amendment, a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is permitted within ten days after the entry of the judgment, or after that time upon leave of the court. It is proposed to amend Rule 59(b) by providing that under that rule a motion for new trial shall be served not later than ten days after the entry of the judgment, whatever the ground be for the motion, whether error by the court or newly discovered evidence. On the other hand, one of the purposes of the bill of review in equity was to afford relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence long after the entry of the judgment. Therefore, to permit relief by a motion similar to that heretofore obtained on bill of review, Rule 60(b) as amended permits an application for relief to be made by motion, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, within one year after judgment. Such a motion under Rule 60(b) does not affect the finality of the judgment, but a motion under Rule 59, made within 10 days, does affect finality and the running of the time for appeal.

If these various amendments, including principally those to Rule 60(b), accomplish the purpose for which they are intended, the federal rules will deal with the practice in every sort of case in which relief from final judgments is asked, and prescribe the practice. With reference to the question whether, as the rules now exist, relief by coram nobis, bills of review, and so forth, is permissible, the generally accepted view is that the remedies are still available, although the precise relief obtained in a particular case by use of these ancillary remedies is shrouded in ancient lore and mystery. See Wallace v. United States (C.C.A.2d, 1944) 142 F.(2d) 240, cert. den. (1944) 323 U.S. 712; Fraser v. Doing (App.D.C. 1942) 130 F.(2d) 617; Jones v. Watts (C.C.A.5th, 1944) 142 F.(2d) 575; Preveden v. Hahn (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 36 F.Supp. 952; Cavallo v. Agwilines, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 2, 2 F.R.D. 526; McGinn v. United States (D.Mass. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 3, 2 F.R.D. 562; City of Shattuck, Oklahoma ex rel. Versluis v. Oliver (W.D.Okla. 1945) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 3; Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623, 631–653; 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (1938) 3254 et seq.; Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of Relief From Judgment, op. cit. supra. Cf. Norris v. Camp (C.C.A.10th, 1944) 144 F.(2d) 1; Reed v. South Atlantic Steamship Co. of Delaware (D.Del. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 1; Laughlin v. Berens (D.D.C. 1945) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 1, 73 W.L.R. 209.

The transposition of the words “the court” and the addition of the word “and” at the beginning of the first sentence are merely verbal changes. The addition of the qualifying word “final” emphasizes the character of the judgments, orders or proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions of the rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford such relief from them as justice requires.

The qualifying pronoun “his” has been eliminated on the basis that it is too restrictive, and that the subdivision should include the mistake or neglect of others which may be just as material and call just as much for supervisory jurisdiction as where the judgment is taken against the party through his mistake, inadvertence, etc.

Fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party are express grounds for relief by motion under amended subdivision (b). There is no sound reason for their exclusion. The incorporation of fraud and the like within the scope of the rule also removes confusion as to the proper procedure. It has been held that relief from a judgment obtained by extrinsic fraud could be secured by motion within a “reasonable time,” which might be after the time stated in the rule had run. Fiske v. Buder (C.C.A.8th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 841; see also inferentially Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co. (C.C.A.9th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 213. On the other hand, it has been suggested that in view of the fact that fraud was omitted from original Rule 60(b) as a ground for relief, an independent action was the only proper remedy. Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other Methods of Relief From Judgment (1941) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 942, 945. The amendment settles this problem by making fraud an express ground for relief by motion; and under the saving clause, fraud may be urged as a basis for relief by independent action insofar as established doctrine permits. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623, 653–659; 3 Moore‘s Federal Practice (1938) 3267 et seq. And the rule expressly does not limit the power of the court, when fraud has been perpetrated upon it, to give relief under the saving clause. As an illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co. (1944) 322 U.S. 238.

The time limit for relief by motion in the court and in the action in which the judgment was rendered has been enlarged from six months to one year.

It should be noted that Rule 60(b) does not assume to define the substantive law as to the grounds for vacating judgments, but merely prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief.

It should also be noted that under §200(4) of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. [App.] §501 et seq. [§520(4)]), a judgment rendered in any action or proceeding governed by the section may be vacated under certain specified circumstances upon proper application to the court.

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1948 Amendment

The amendment substitutes the present statutory reference.

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1987 Amendment

The amendment is technical. No substantive change is intended.

Committee Notes on Rules—2007 Amendment

The language of Rule 60 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.

The final sentence of former Rule 60(b) said that the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment was by motion as prescribed in the Civil Rules or by an independent action. That provision is deleted as unnecessary. Relief continues to be available only as provided in the Civil Rules or by independent action.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 12. Defenses and Objections: When and How Presented; Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving Defenses; Pretrial Hearing

(B) if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after the more definite statement is served.

(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion:

(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;

(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;

(3) improper venue;

(4) insufficient process;

(5) insufficient service of process;

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS

1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th & 14th

Definition from Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary

1st Amendment                                              The amendment to the U.S. Constitution that guarantees freedom of religion, freedom of expression (including speech, press, assembly, association, and belief), and freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

4th Amendment

U.S. Constitution

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

5th Amendment

fifth amendment: an overview

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

The clauses incorporated within the Fifth Amendment outline basic constitutional limits on police procedure. The Framers derived the Grand Juries Clause and the Due Process Clause from the Magna Carta, dating back to 1215. Scholars consider the Fifth Amendment as capable of breaking down into the following five distinct constitutional rights: grand juries for capital crimes, a prohibition on double jeopardy, a prohibition against required self-incrimination, a guarantee that all criminal defendants will have a fair trial, and a promise that the government will not seize private property without paying market value. While the Fifth Amendment originally only applied to federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment’s provisions as now applying to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Grand Juries

Grand juries are a holdover from hundreds of years ago, originating during Britain’s early history. Deeply-rooted in the Anglo-American tradition, the grand jury originally served to protect the accused from overly-zealous prosecutions by the English monarchy.

Congressional statutes outline the means by which a grand jury shall be impaneled. Ordinarily, the grand jurors are selected from the pool of prospective jurors who potentially could serve on a given day in any juror capacity. At common-law, a grand jury consists of between 12 and 23 members. Because the Grand jury was derived from the common-law, courts use the common-law as a means of interpreting the Grand Jury Clause. While state legislatures may set the statutory number of grand jurors anywhere within the common-law requirement of 12 to 23, statutes setting the number outside of this range violate the Fifth Amendment. Federal law has set the federal grand jury number as falling between 16 and 23.

A person being charged with a crime that warrants a grand jury has the right to challenge members of the grand juror for partiality or bias, but these challenges differ from peremptory challenges, which a defendant has when choosing a trial jury. When a defendant makes a peremptory challenge, the judge must remove the juror without making any proof, but in the case of a grand juror challenge, the challenger must establish the cause of the challenge by meeting the same burden of proof as the establishment of any other fact would require. Grand juries possess broad authority to investigate suspected crimes. They may not, however, conduct “fishing expeditions” or hire individuals not already employed by the government to locate testimony or documents. Ultimately, grand juries may make a presentment. During a presentment the grand jury informs the court that they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect committed a crime.

Double Jeopardy

The Double Jeopardy Clause aims to protect against the harassment of an individual through successive prosecutions of the same alleged act, to ensure the significance of an acquittal, and to prevent the state from putting the defendant through the emotional, psychological, physical, and financial troubles that would accompany multiple trials for the same alleged offense. Courts have interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause as accomplishing these goals by providing the following three distinct rights: a guarantee that a defendant will not face a second prosecution after an acquittal, a guarantee that a defendant will not face a second prosecution after a conviction, and a guarantee that a defendant will not receive multiple punishments for the same offense. Courts, however, have not interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause as either prohibiting the state from seeking review of a sentence or restricting a sentence’s length on rehearing after a defendant’s successful appeal.

Jeopardy refers to the danger of conviction. Thus, jeopardy does not attach unless a risk of the determination of guilt exists. If some event or circumstance prompts the trial court to declare a mistrial, jeopardy has not attached if the mistrial only results in minimal delay and the government does not receive added opportunity to strengthen its case.

Self-Incrimination

The Fifth Amendment protects criminal defendants from having to testify if they may incriminate themselves through the testimony. A witness may “plead the Fifth” and not answer if the witness believes answering the question may be self-incriminatory.

In the landmark Miranda v. Arizona ruling, the United States Supreme Court extended the Fifth Amendment protections to encompass any situation outside of the courtroom that involves the curtailment of personal freedom. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Therefore, any time that law enforcement takes a suspect into custody, law enforcement must make the suspect aware of all rights. Known as Miranda rights, these rights include the right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and the right to have a government-appointed attorney if the suspect cannot afford one.

If law enforcement fails to honor these safeguards, courts will often suppress any statements by the suspect as violative of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, provided that the suspect has not actually waived the rights. An actual waiver occurs when a suspect has made the waiver knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. To determine if a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver has occurred, a court will examine the totality of the circumstances, which considers all pertinent circumstances and events. If a suspect makes a spontaneous statement while in custody prior to being made aware of the Miranda rights, law enforcement can use the statement against the suspect, provided that police interrogation did not prompt the statement.

After Congress passed the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, some felt that the statute by implication overruled the requirements of Miranda. Some scholars also felt that Congress constitutionally exercised its power in passing this law because they felt that Miranda represented a matter of judicial policy rather than an actual manifestation of Fifth Amendment protections. In Dickerson v. United States the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this  arguments and held that the Warren Court had directly derived Miranda from the Fifth Amendment.

Due Process Clause

The guarantee of due process for all citizens requires the government to respect all rights, guarantees, and protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution and all applicable statutes before the government can deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. Due process essentially guarantees that a party will receive a fundamentally fair, orderly, and just judicial proceeding. While the Fifth Amendment only applies to the federal government, the identical text in the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly applies this due process requirement to the states as well.

Courts have come to recognize that two aspects of due process exist: procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural due process aims to ensure fundamental fairness by guaranteeing a party the right to be heard, ensuring that the parties receive proper notification throughout the litigation, and ensures that the adjudicating court has the appropriate jurisdiction to render a judgment. Meanwhile, substantive due process has developed during the 20th century as protecting those right so fundamental as to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”

6th Amendment

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

9th Amendment

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

10th Amendment

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

11th Amendment

Amendment XI

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

Amendment XIV

Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 4.

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Treaties of Arrest and False Imprisonment

by Charles A Weisman© Dec 1993 by

Charles A Weisman 2nd edition Dec 1994, 3rd edition Nov 1996

Published by Weisman Publications P O Box 22405EganMN55122

ISBN 1-929205-08-2 Printed in the United States of America

INVALID AND UNLAWFUL WARRANTS

CHP 6 (PG 46 – 48)

Invalid and Unlawful Warrants

•A warrant must.have certain requisites in order to render it valid and available as a defense. Many unlawful arrests have been made due to warrants failing to meet such requisites. “Whenever a warrant is invalid on its face, or where it is only a summons, the officer arresting the defendants will be liable in damages.”30 A prima facie invalid warrant will be regarded as no warrant and the officer making an arrest by a void or invalid warrant is not protected by it.

Process that is void on its face is no protection to the officer who executes it. If a warrant, order, or writ of possession shows lack of jurisdiction of the court, the officer is not protected in serving it. In fact, in so doing he becomes a trespasser.31

a constable was not justified in attempting to arrest the defendant under a warrant which was in the sheriffs hands. The court said that, “it was the duty of an officer who attempts to make an arrest to exhibit the warrant if he has one.”

A constable justifying an imprisonment under a warrant must show that the warrant on its face is legal, and that the magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject-matter.32 Both a proper subject matter jurisdiction and. geographical jurisdiction are necessary for a vaWwarrant. It is generally held that where the court has no jurisdiction the officer executing a warrant will be liable in damages. The question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, and since neither consent nor waiver can give jurisdiction, the court will not proceed where it appears from the record that it has no authority

A warrant for the arrest of an alleged fugitive was void because the complaint did not state that the original charge has been made upon oath, or made to a court, and it afforded no protection to the constable.34

The requirements of what a warrant should contain depends primarily on constitutional mandates and common law principles.

The common law requires that an arrest made on a warrant be issued only after a formal charge is made under oath.35 Thus no arrest is valid unless based upon a sworn affidavit.

An affidavit that does not appear to have been sworn before any judicial officer, and a warrant signed only by the officer who made the arrest and not dated or authenticated, afford no lawful authority for the arrest and detention of an accused.36

Another obvious requirement of a warrant that would make it void on its face is if it is not signed by a magistrate or justice of the peace. It has become a practice in some areas to have warrants rubber stamped with the Judges name. This stamping being done by some clerk or administrative •employee. This blatantly unlawful practice has been adopted for convenience sake, which is the most common reason or excuse government uses to transcend constitutional limitations. Such limitations were designed to make government follow certain established procedures and thus make things difficult in order to deprive a citizen of his liberty or property. A rubber stamped warrant is invalid on its face as it is not signed by any judicial officer/’TBe authorization for a warrant requires- not only judicial authority but is to be done by one who is learned in the law to determine if probable cause exists to issue the warrant.

In Minnesota, the State Supreme Court held that a statute permitting clerks and deputy clerks of the County Municipal Court to receive complaints and issue warrants in prosecutions under municipal ordinances is unconstitutional. The Court said:

The United States Supreme Court has considered and disposed of a related problem hi Comoro v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 541. * * * The majority in Camera nevertheless stressed the need for “individualized review” by a “neutral magistrate” to avoid the issuance of “rubber stamp” warrants.37

Since the taking of an affidavit in a criminal proceeding imposes a duty of a judicial nature, an affidavit taken before a clerk or prosecuting attorney is not sufficient as a basis for the issuance of a warrant.38

A warrant is regarded as insufficient and thus void if, on its face, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime.39 Also, a designation or description of the offense should be written in the warrant, but need not be specified with the same technical strictness that is required in an indictment.40 The rule on sufficiency of a charge on which a warrant can issue is stated as follows:

The complaint or charge on which a warrant is issued must set forth the facts constituting the offense on the knowledge of the person making the complaint, and if he does not know them other witnesses must be examined who do know them; and no person can be arrested on the mere belief of the person making the complaint.41 A warrant issued for a matter that is not a criminal offense is no justification for a constable who arrests upon it. A person cannot be lawfully arrested by a sheriff acting under a copy of a court order or warrant in the form required.42 Such copy is not valid.

Inaccuracies and imperfection do not vitiate a warrant which substantially charges an offense. But where a complaint, recited in substance in a warrant, is verified merely on information and belief and does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense, the warrant must be held to be invalid on its face.43 Also, an affidavit that merely states belief in the guilt of the accused is insufficient to support a warrant of arrest.44 The Supreme Court of Kansas said that a warrant cannot be issued which is verified on the county attorney’s hearsay and belief: If a warrant, in the first instance, may issue upon mere hearsay or belief, then all the guards of the common law and of the bill of rights, to protect the liberty and property of the citizen against arbitrary power, are swept away.

An affidavit based upon a presumption or “belief of crime does not give jurisdiction to the court to issue a warrant; and at common law, a constable or sheriff cannot execute a warrant outside their jurisdiction.46

 To summarize, the following are the basic requisites needed to make a warrant valid :

• A warrant is to be issued by a judicial officer and signed by him.

• It must state the facts that show the matter to be within the jurisdiction of the judicial officer issuing it.

It cannot be based upon belief or suspicion, but upon probable cause.

  • The warrant is to list a complaint which is to state the offense committed and the facts that constitute a crime.
  • A warrant is to contain an affidavit of the person making the charge under oath.
  • It must truly name the person to be arrested, or describe him sufficiently to identify him.
  • The officer is bound to know if under the law the warrant is defective, and not fair on its face, and he is liable as a trespasser, if it does not appear on its face to be a lawful warrant. His ignorance is no excuse.47

Every citizen should when arrested (or at trial) request to see a warrant and check that it meets required criteria and object if it does not. Such vigilance is necessary to secure liberty and to stop unlawful and oppressive measures from continuing in government.

29   People v. Shanley, 40 Hun 477, 478 (N.Y., 1886).

30   51 L. R. A., 197, citing Fnuier v. Turner, 76 Wis. 562,1(5 N.W. 4Il-,-

31   1Q American Jurisprudence, 2d Ed., “Sheriffs, Police, and Constables,” § 165, pp. 353-54.

32 Lawyers Reports Annotated, vol. 51, p. 197, citing, Poulk v. Slocutn, 3 Blacfcf ords (Ind.) 421.

33     ;5 American Jurisprudence, 2d Ed., “Arrest,” § 7, p. 700.

34     Lawyers Reports Annotated, voL 51, p. 197, citing, Forbes v. Hicks, 27 Neb.Ill, 42 N.W. 898 (1889).

35     Morrow v. State, 140 Neb. 592, 300 N.W. 843,845 (1941).

36     Liberia v. Harper, 89 Flai 477, 104 So. 853, 855 (1925). Also see 5 Am. Jur. 2d “Arrest,” §12, p. 705.

37     State v. Paulick, 277 Minn. 140, 151 N.W.2d 591,596 (1967). Also: Co* v. Perkins, 107 S.E. 863, 865 (Oa. 1921).

38  Cox v. Perkins, 151 Ga. 632, 107 S.E. 863 (1921).

39     Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, 12th Ed., vol. 1, § 54, p. 152 (1974).   Citing, Go-Ban Importing Co, v. United States,
282 US. 344,355 (1930); Ex pane Bwford, 7 U.S. 448,451 (1806); Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116,106 Pac. 653, (1910).

40 Delk v. Commonwealth, 166Ky.39, 178 S.W. 1129(1915); Moser v. Fulk, 237 N.C. 302, 74 S.E.2d 729.(1953)

41        2 R.CJL.”Arrest,” 517, p. 460; dtnifcflrowj v. Hadmn, 182 Mich. 491, 148 N.W. 693 (1914).

42   5 American Jurisprudence, 2d ed., “Arrest,” 9 7, p. 700; citing, Leighton V. Hatt, 31 Dl. 108 (1863).
43 5 American Jurisprudence, 2d Ed., “Anest,” § 8, p. 702.

44      Giordenello w, United States, 357 U.S. 480f 78 Sup. Ct. 1245 (195i7),

45  The State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. Rep. 245,251 (1884).

46  61 American Law Reports, Annotated, pp. 377-379; Housh v. People, 75 M, 487 (1874).

47 Tiedeman, Limitations of Police Power, p. 83, citing: Grumon v, Raymond, 1 Conn. 39;   Clayton v; Scott, 45 Vt. 386

Treaties of Arrest and False Imprisonment

by Charles A Weisman© Dec 1993 by

Charles A Weisman 2nd edition Dec 1994, 3rd edition Nov 1996

Published by Weisman Publications P O Box 22405EganMN55122

ISBN 1-929205-08-2 Printed in the United States of America

BRINGING ARRESTED PERSON BEFORE A MAGISTRATE

Duty of Officer (CHP 7 pg 49 – 58)

 BRINGING ARRESTED PERSON BEFORE A MAGISTRATE

 Duty of Officer

It is a fundamental rule of procedure well grounded in the common law, that where an arrest is made the alleged offender is to be taken “before a magistrate to be dealt with according to law”1 This is not only to be done, but done without delay, or without unnecessary delay, otherwise the arresting party is liable for a false imprisonment

In Blackstone’s Commentaries, Vol. 4, Chap. XXI, p. 292, it was stated that “A constable may, without warrant, arrest any one for a breach of the peace committed in his view, and carry him before a Justice of the peace.” The officer must bring a person he has arrested directly to a magistrate, otherwise it is a breach of duty. .

It is the duty of an officer or other person making an arrest to take the prisoner before a magistrate with reasonable diligence and without unnecessary delay; and the rule is well settled that whether the arrest is made with or without a warrant, an action for false imprisonment may be predicated upon an unreasonable delay in taking the person arrested before a magistrate regardless of the lawfulness of the arrest in the first instance.2

Thus, even if the arrest was lawful, a failure to take the person arrested to a magistrate will be regarded as unlawful imprisonment, As the Supreme Court of Minnesota held:

Even though an arrest be lawful, a detention of the prisoner for an unreasonable time without taking him before a committing magistrate will constitute false imprisonment3

In an exhaustive decision on the common / law rule of the process and procedure for arrests, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in

the case ‘of Orick v. State, said: “By the common law of England” an “arrest without warrant for a felony” can be made, “only for the purpose of bringing the offender before a civil magistrate.” 4

This procedure is the due process of law/ to be followed in depriving one of his liberty. Thus a failure or even a delay in following this process is an unlawful restraint or deprivation of liberty and thus a type of false imprisonment The arresting officer has no authority to take a person to a jail and detain him there. His duty is to take the one arrested without delay to a court or magistrate, as said by the Supreme Court of Kansas:

The law contemplates that an arrest either by an officer or a private person with or without a warrant is a step in a public prosecution, and must be made with a view of taking the person before a magistrate or judicial tribunal for examination or trial; and an officer, even, subjects himself to liability if there is an unreasonable delay after an arrest in presenting the person for examination or trial.5

The only reason that can justify having an arrested person in jail or detained by the arresting officer, is as a necessary step in bringing him before a magistrate, as so stated by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island:

When an officer makes an arrest, without warrant, it is his duty to take the person arrested, without un­necessary delay, before a magistrate or

other proper judicial officer having jurisdiction, in order that he may be   : •  examined and held or dealt with as the case requires. But to detain the person arrested in custody for any purpose other than that of taking him before a magistrate is illegal.6

Thus detainment in a jail for purposes of “booking” or fingerprinting or investigating the alleged crime, or interrogation of the prisoner is illegal.

In cases involving the commission of the most severe crimes, as in felonies, the one arresting is still required, without un­necessary delay, to bring the prisoner to the nearest magistrate or court as a matter of fundamental law:

From the earliest dawn of the common law, a constable could arrest without warrant when he had reasonable

grounds to suspect that a felony had been committed; and he was authorized to detain the suspected party such a reasonable length of time as would enable him to carry the accused before a magistrate. And this is still the law of the land.

The Court went on to state that the officer making the arrest is liable for false imprisonment if he arrests with the intent of only detaining, or if his unreasonable delay causes a detainment. On pg. 1092 it stated:

It cannot be questioned that, when a person is arrested, either with or without a warrant, it becomes the duty of the officer or the individual making the arrest to convey the prisoner in a reasonable time, and without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate. to be dealt with as the exigency of the case may require. The power to make the arrest does not include the power to unduly detain in custody; but, on the contrary, is coupled with a correlative duty, incumbent on the officer, to take the accused before a magistrate ‘as soon . as he reasonably can’ (authorities cited). If the officer fails to do this, and unreasonably detains.the accused in custody, he will be guilty of a false imprisonment, no matter how lawful the original arrest may have been. (Citing, 1 Hil. Torts, pp. 213-14, sec. 9).

Thus, where a person arrested is taken to a jail or sheriffs office and detained there, with no warrant issued before or after the arrest, it is false imprisonment. The one arresting has “a duty to immediately seek a magistrate,” and that the failure to do so, “makes a case of false imprisonment, as a matter of law, is held by all the authorities.08

In a case involving an indictment for assault and false imprisonment, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that in the process of a lawful arrest, the one arrested is to be taken immediately to a judge:

[T] he question occurs, what is the officer to do with the offender when he shall have been arrested without warrant. All the authorities agree that he should be carried, as soon as conveniently may be, before some justice of the peace.9

Though this case involved an arrest without warrant, the Court said it is the duty of the arresting officer upon making an arrest, “whether with a warrant or without one,” to carry the offender at once before a justice.

      To take an arrested person to a jail to be detained and fingerprinted is a violation of his rights. It is proof the officer had no intent to bring the accused directly to a judge. In Anderson’s Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs, the subject of an officer’s duty after arrest was examined with this conclusion:

 It is the undoubted right on the part of a prisoner, on being arrested by a public officer or private citizen, and un­questionably a corresponding duty on the part of the one making the arrest, to take the prisoner before a court or magistrate for a hearing or examination and this must be done without unnecessary delay. The object of this right and corresponding duty is that the prisoner may be examined, held, or dealt with as the law directs and the facts of the case require. * * * It is highly improper and an invasion of the lawful rights of the prisoner to take him to any other place than to a proper court or magistrate.10

In deciding the proper duty and action of an arresting officer after making an arrest, the Supreme Court of Appeals for Virginia stated that the right of the accused to prompt judicial examination does not depend upon their statute law:

But even if the circumstances of the arrest were not within the purview of this particular statute, it was the duty of the arresting officer to have taken the defendant within a reasonable time, or without unnecessary delay, before a judicial officer in order that the latter might inquire into the matter and determine whether a warrant should be issued for the detention of the defendant, or whether he should be released.11

And, in speaking on what manner of arrests were lawful at common law, and what are the procedures under the common law when an arrest is made, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that:

Coupled with the authority to arrest went an imperative obligation on the officer to bring the arrested person before a magistrate without un­reasonable delay. -Especially was this true where the arrest had been made without a warrant. * * ‘ When an officer makes an arrest, without warrant, it is his duty to take the person arrested, without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate or other proper judicial officer having jurisdiction, in order that he may be examined and held or dealt with as the case requires; but to detain ^ the person arrested

in custody for any purpose other than that of taking him before a magistrate is illegal:12

This rule of law requiring an officer or person arresting to bring the party arrested before a magistrate is the same in all states and cannot be abrogated by statute. The same rule has been upheld in Federal courts, and is prescribed under Title 18 in the Rules of Criminal Procedure:

An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint, or any person making an arrest without a warrant, shall take the arrested  person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate. or in the event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. §3041.13

In a Federal case where a man was arrested by two F.B.I. agents assisted by two local policeman on an outstanding warrant for bank robbery, the agents placed the man in a police vehicle, drove a few blocks, and then parked on the street under a street lamp. The officers interviewed the man con­cerning the crime and within a few minutes he confessed to the crime. The Federal Court of Appeals said the confession was inadmissible and reversed his conviction, as the momentary parking of the police vehicle en route from the place of arrest was a detour from the path toward a prompt presentment before a magistrate. The Court stated:

The law requires an arresting officer to bring an accused before a magistrate “as quickly as possible.” (Cases cited). 14

The rights of the accused were violated as he was not “promptly taken before ajudicial officer as the law required,” but instead was questioned while held in custody. It is said that police are guilty of oppression and neglect of duty when they willfully detain a prisoner without arraigning him before a magistrate within a reasonable time.15

In a case where a person sued for being arrested without warrant and confined in a jail without examination before a court or magistrate, it was found on appeal that such action was unlawful, and the Supreme Court of Illinois held:

We are of opinion, the arrest of the plaintiff was illegal, and the verdict contrary.to the law and the evidence. And if the arrest was legal, they did not proceed according to law, and take him before a magistrate for examination. but conveyed him to another county, and there imprisoned him hi the county jail, in a filthy cell, thus invading one of the dearest and most sacred rights of the citizen, secured to him by the great charter of our land. Kindred v. Stitt, 51 ILL. 401, 409 (1869).

• The requirement of bringing an arrested person directly to a court or judge is due process of law, and as such this procedure cannot be abrogated by statute.

As a Trespasser Ab Initio

„. It is a familiar rule of law that one who abuses an authority given him by law becomes a trespasser ab initio.17 That is, he becomes a wrongdoer from the beginning of his actions.

Where one fails to take a prisoner he has arrested to a proper judge, or where he causes an unreasonable  ‘delay in doing so, the officer becomes a trespasser ab initio 18 The unlawful confinement by an officer makes the entire transaction, including the arrest, unlawful and a trespass.

Thus even in cases where an executive officer had made a lawful arrest, if he fails to bring the arrested person to a magistrate he becomes a trespasser ab initio and liable:

An officer, who has lawfully arrested a prisoner, may be guilty of false

. imprisonment if he holds him for an unreasonable length of time without presenting him for hearing or procuring a proper warrant for his detention. 1!

the New York Supreme Court of Appeals stated the correct exposition of the law in a case where it said that “even though the arrest, when made, was legal and justified,” the officers “became trespassers ab initio and so continued to the time of plaintiffs release because of their failure to take him before a Magistrate as required.”^ And the Court of Claims of New York, in a case where the officers delayed in the claimant’s arraignment, held that:

If there was an unnecessary delay [in arraigning the claimant before a Justice of the Peace], then the arrest itself became unlawful on the theory that the defendants were trespassers ab initio and so continued down to the time when the plaintiff was lawfully held under a warrant of commitment, regardless of

whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of any crime (numerous cases cited). In Pastor v. Regan, supra, it is said that: “The rule laid down in the Six Carpenters’ case, 8 Coke, 146, that if a man abuses an authority given him by the law he becomes a trespasser ab initio, has never been questioned.”21

 Where one was arrested for being intoxicated and confined in a prison without judicial inquiry, it was held to be a wrongful imprisonment. On this matter the Supreme Court of Washington stated:

Nor is a police officer authorized to confine a person indefinitely whom he lawfully arrested. It is his duty to take him before some court having jurisdiction of the offense and make a complaint against him. * * * Any undue delay is unlawful and wrongful, and renders the officer himself and all persons aiding and abetting therein, wrongdoers from the beginning.22

Thus when one fails to perform part of his duty and it impinges upon the rights of a citizen, he is said to be a trespasser from the beginning because his whole justification fails, and he stands as if he never had any authority at all to act.23

Detainment Is Not A Decision Of Arresting Officer

The basis of the well established procedure in law of taking a person arrested directly to a judge or court, is to avoid having the liberty of the citizen unjustly dealt with by extra-judicial acts of executive officers.

We believe that fundamental fairness to the accused requires that he should with reasonable promptness be taken before a magistrate in order to prevent the application of methods approaching what is commonly called the “third degree.” “Fundamental fairness” prohibits the secret inquisition in order to obtain evidence.”‘

Other reasons for the purpose of this rule requiring that the arrested accused “be taken^ before a magistrate as quickly as possible, is to make certain that the person arrested is advised by a judicial officer of his con­stitutional rights.”25 This is not a duty of the officer through the erroneous “Miranda Warning.The only reason such warnings are being used is because police are not doing their duty in bringing the person arrested to a judicial officer, but instead are unlawfully taking them to a jail to have them “booked.”

The detainment of a person after he is arrested is a judicial question. A judicial officer must decide if there are grounds for holding the person arrested, or whether he must be further examined by trial, or if he is to be bailed and released. To allow the executive department such powers of decision making is the epitome of despotism.

In a suit for false imprisonment where several officers arrested the plaintiff, on grounds he committed a felony, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the officers had no right to decide to detain the plaintiff to enable them to make a further investigation of the charge against him.

The Court declared that:

But having so arrested him, it was their [the officers'] duty to take him before a magistrate, who could determine whether or not there was ground to hold him. It was not for the arresting officers to settle that question (authorities cited). * * * The arresting officer is in no sense his guardian, and can Justify the arrest only by bringing the prisoner before the proper court, that either the prisoner may be liberated or that further proceedings may be instituted against ihim.26

In a case where one was accused by another of stealing a watch, and sub­sequently arrested and put in jail for one hour and then released, the sheriff was found guilty of false imprisonment as be “failed to take the person arrested before a, magistrate.” The Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the conviction stating that:

[T]he power of detaining a person arrested, or restraining him, of his liberty^is not a matter within the discretion of the officer making the arrest.27

The Court further stated that the sheriff cannot legally hold the person arrested in custody for a longer period of time than is reasonably necessary, under all the circumstances of the case, without possessing a proper warrant of taking him before a magistrate. If he does it is false imprison­ment. Thus where a sheriff had arrested two prisoners and detained them for five hours without making any effort to take them before a magistrate, he was guilty of false imprisonment. In this case the Supreme Court of Idaho said:

 The rule seems to be that an officer arresting a person on criminal process who omits to perform a duty required by law, such as taking the prisoner before a court, becomes liable for false imprisonment.

The law never allows an officer at his dis­cretion to imprison the person arrested or detain him in a jail after arrest:

We have no doubt that the exercise of the power of detention does not rest wholly with the officer making the arrest and that he should, within a reasonable time, take the prisoner before a circuit, criminal, or other  judicial court. * * * In a case where the arrest is made under a warrant, the officer must take the prisoner, without any unnecessary delay, before the magistrate issuing it, in order that the party may have a speedy examination, if he desires it; and in the case of an arrest without warrant the duty is equally plain, and for the same reason, to take the arrested party before some officer who can take such proof as may be afforded. 2I

Executive officers or clerks are not to determine if a person arrested is to be held or released upon bail, or fix the amount of bail, since the power to do so is judicial.

In a case where a person was lawfully arrested for driving an automobile while intoxicated, the arresting officer delivered him to the jailer at 4:30 p.m., with the instruction that he be held there until nine o’clock p.m., at which time he was to be brought before the judicial officer. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia condemned this act asserting that the officer usurped the functions of a judicial officer:

But the actions of the arresting officer and the jailer in denying the defendant this opportunity [to judicial review] by confining him in jail because they concluded that he was not in such condition to be admitted to bail, had the effect of substituting their discretion in  the matter for that of the judicial officer. Under the circumstances here, the defendant was clearly entitled to the benefit of a judicial opinion and judgment upon the question of his eligibility for bail. This right was arbitrarily denied him. 3

Executive officers cannot hold a person in order to complete paperwork or make out reports. Thus where a man was arrested without warrant and confined in the county jail without a commitment, the sheriff could not justify the confinement of the man by awaiting the pleasure of a deputy, or any one else, to file a complaint.32 The power of the executive officer over a person’s liberty ends with the lawful arrest, and he never has a discretionary power to detain the person without judicial authority.

If the plaintiff was being detained for the purpose of arrest, it was the duty of the arresting officer to take him before an. examining magistrate as soon as the nature of the circumstances would reasonably permit The power to arrest does not confer upon the arresting officer the power to detain a prisoner for other purposes.

 Arresting And Releasing Without Bringing Before a Judge:

While most of the emphasis on this type of false imprisonment deals with the delay in presenting a prisoner to a judge, the real duty and requirement is the  actual bringing, carrying or presenting the prisoner before a judge. Thus a complete failure to do this is obviously unlawful, and this most often occurs when the officer releases the person he arrested without judicial presentment.

An officer who arrests an individual, does not have the authority to place such person, in a jail, or other holding place, and then later release him.    As was revealed in the case of Harness v. Steele,^ where the sheriff placed the person arrested in jail for an hour; and then released him without bringing him before a Justice of the Peace, he was thus guilty of false imprisonment.

It has become a common practice for arrested persons to be taken to a jail or police station to be “booked” fingerprinted, photographed, measured, questioned, imprisoned and then released after paper work is completed. This wicked and oppressive procedure is so far removed from what due process of law requires, it is shocking that such measures could be widely accepted as “legal.” The process of imprisonment and release at the discretion of the executive officer was condemned by the Supreme Court of Illinois in stating:

When officers assume the power to imprison without authority of law, or without any forms or processes usual and necessary to be employed, they become liable for false imprisonment The liberty of the citizen cannot be so far trifled with, that any constable in the land may of his own volition, commit and hold him in custody until it suits his convenience or pleasure to release him.38

When a constable or sheriff decides to release the person arrested without taking him before a magistrate, he assumes judicial powers upon himself and is liable. Thus where a town constable arrested a person who was intoxicated, and imprisoned him in “lock-up” until he became sober and then released him without taking him before a magistrate, he acted unlawfully and is liable. In this case the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated:

Men may not be arrested, imprisoned and released upon judgment or at the discretion of a constable or any one else. If the alleged offense be criminal in its character * * * the officer may arrest and take the offender before a magistrate for trial. * * * The constable arrested and imprisoned him, not for safe keeping until he could be tried before a competent tribunal, but he imprisoned him until he became sober, according to his judgment, and then released him. The constable thus constituted himself the judge, jury and executioner. This is the best description of despotism.36

When an officer institutes an arrest, he now has undertaken the duty to bring the arrested party to a magistrate. The person can only be released by judicial, not executive, authority The duty of the one making an arrest to bring the prisoner before a proper magistrate that proceedings for the trial of the prisoner may be   instituted and that he may have an opportunity to give bail or otherwise procure his release, is even more imperative than if a warrant had been issued before arrest; and if the prisoner is released without being brought before such magistrate, the officer or private person who made the arrest becomes a trespasser ab initio. **

Arresting a person is a step in prose­cution, and if he is released not according to law it is an “escape.” Such an escape is a departure of a prisoner from custody before he is discharged by due process of law.38 If a person is arrested pursuant to a warrant, he “must be taken to a magistrate before he can be released” (1 Wharton, Cr. Proc., 195).

In deciding if a chief of police acted properly when he put two individuals he arrested in jail over night, and releasing them on their depositing bail, the Federal Court of Appeals said “the actions of the officer in this case were arbitrary and- unjust.” The police chief had no right to determine bail and then release the prisoners without a hearing before a judge, the Court said :

In an able opinion (Ex porte Harvell, 267 F. 997, 1003), Judge Conner said: “The imprisonment in jail of a citizen without warrant, without opportunity for a hearing or to give bail, is a serious matter. * * * The duty in every case is imperative upon the officer to forthwith carry the person arrested before the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction to hear and determine the legality of such arrest.’ Ex pane Van Haven, Fed. Cas. No. 16,858. * * * In 25 C.J. 491 and 493 the general rule is stated as follows: “One making an arrest may be liable in an action’for false imprisonment where he fails to take the person arrested before the officer designated hi the warrant, or, if the arrest is made without warrant, to the nearest committing magistrate.

If a prisoner accepts his release or is ‘released at his request or with his consent, he does not waive his right of action. To say he has no right to sue .under such conditions, is allowing a situation that is “susceptible of working great injustice.” Where a person is unlawfully detained, “he has a right of action irrespective of his release.”

Defenses

Just as “good faith does not excuse an unauthorized arrest,” likewise, it does not “justify an unreasonable detention and deprivation of one’s liberty” caused by a failure or delay in bringing one arrested “before a magistrate.”41 It has been a common practice for officers to drop off persons they have arrested at a “police station” or “county jail” and leave the prisoner in the custody of others. This is a very dangerous and irresponsible act for an officer to follow. In doing so the arresting officer relinquishes his duty and at his risk relies on others to lawfully deal with the arrested party. No officer can claim exemption from  liability when he relies on others to take the arrested person before a judge without delay. He is responsible for the arrested person and cannot rely on others to perform his duty:

Orders from a superior do not excuse the arresting party from his duty [to bring the prisoner before a judge], nor does delivery of the prisoner into the custody of another person; all those who take part hi so detaining a person an unreasonable length of time are liable.42

The Supreme Court of Ohio had stated a similar rule:

The delivery of the plaintiff, after his arrest, into custody of another person, to be by him taken to prison, could not, we think, absolve the arresting officers from the duty required of them to obtain the writ necessary to legalize his further imprisonment. * * * If the arresting officers choose to rely on some other person to perform that required duty, they take upon themselves the risk of its being performed; and, unless it is done in proper time, their liability to the person imprisoned is in no wise lessened or affected43

One of the most common defenses raised in suits of false imprisonment of this nature, involve arguments of whether the delay in bringing one to a court was reasonable or necessary. In Virginia it was said that in determining whether an arrested person has been brought before a magistrate “with all practicable speed,” or without unnecessary delay, depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. “Ordinarily, this is a question for the jury unless the facts are disputed.”44

The Common Law principle is that an officer is to present the person arrested “without delay” to a magistrate. This means

no delay of time is allowed which is not incident to the act of bringing the accused to a magistrate. The cause of this breach of duty arises from the officer’s total failure to act, or failure to act timely. If he does not act diligently, he may not act timely.

A reasonable time is not when the officer has free time, but means promptly, immediately, and without delay, as soon as the circumstances permit It was stated in an earlier case in New York that:

[I]t was the duty of the officer making the arrest to convey the prisoner immediately before the nearest magistrate.45

In determining whether or not an officer’s failure to take an arrested man before a magistrate immediately after his arrest was an unnecessary delay, the Supreme Court of Texas stated:

The accused has the right to be presented without delay, but the question of what is delay must be determined by all the facts and circumstances. Necessarily some time must elapse between the arrest and the presentment before the magistrate.46

It has been the practice of legislatures and courts to establish set times of 24, 36, or 48 hours for the delay allowed from the tune of arrest until presented to a magistrate. Such measures are blatant acts of tyranny, as anyone can see that if such power exists to allow a delay of 24 hours, then the power also exists to delay 72 hours or 168 hours. The Common Law Rule nullifies the exercise of such arbitrary power.

1 Muscoev. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 443,447, 10 S.E. 534,535 (1890).

2 MuUins v. Sanders, 189 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116,120 (1949), citing, 22 Am. for., False Imprisonment, § 20, p. 366; 35
CJ.S., “False Imprisonment,” §§ 30, 31, pp. 545-547.   Also: Peckham v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 36 Cal. App.2d 214,
97 Pac.2d 472,474 (1939);  Oxford v. Berry, 204 Mich. 197, 170 N.W. 83,88 (1918).

3.”. Ktedan v. Glascock, 215 Minn. 417, 10 N.W.2d 394,397 (1943).

4   Orick v. State, 140 Miss. 184,105 So. 465,470 (1925),  citing, Kurtz v.Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487,499 (1885).

5    Gamier v. Squires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 Fac. 1005,1007 (1900).

6 Komuuky v. Durand, 64 R JL 387,12 AtLZd 652,655 (1940).   Authorities cited,

7    JGrfc v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383,406-07,35 AtL 1089,1091 (1896).

8    Heath v. Boyd, 175 S.W.2d 214,217, (Tex.-1943); Brock v. Stimson, 108 Mass. 520 (1871).

9         State v. Freemen, 86 N.C 683,685-86 (1882).

10            miter H. Anderson,,4 Treatise on the Lew of Sheriffs, Coroners and Constables, Vol. I, § 179-80 (1941).

11  Winston v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 386, 49 SJB.2d 611,615 (1948). Authorities cited therein.

12            Eominsky k Durand, 64 R.1.387, 12 AtUd 652,654, (1940). Authorities cited therein.

13            18 U.S.C.A. “Rules of Criminal Procedure,” Rule 5, p, 29.

14            GreenweUv. United States, 336 Fei2d 962,965 (1964).

15            People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94,96 (1932);   Peckham v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 36 Cal. App.2d 214,
97 Pao2d 472,474 (1939).

16            For other cases on this matter see: Judaon v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 387 (1871); Longv. The State, 12 Oa. 293,318 (1852);
Moses v. State, 6 Oa. App. 251,64 S.E. 699 (1909). Hitt v. Smith, 59 S.E. 475 (Va.-1907); Poison v. Piper, 192 Iowa.
1056,186 N.W. 28, 29 (1922); Edger v. Burke, 96 Md. 715, 54 Atl. 986,988 (1903); Bryan v. Comstock, 220 S.W. 475.

17            Legerv. Warren, 62 Otio St 500, 57 N.E. 506,508 (1900).

18  Great American Indemnity Co. v. Beverly, 150 F.Supp. 134,140 (1956).

19 Thomas Cooley.X Treatise on the Law of Torts, Vol. L §114, p. 374 (numerous authorities cited therein). Farina v,Saratoga Harness Racing Assn., 246 N,Y.S.2d 960,961 (1964). Seguin v. Myers, 108 N.Y.S.ld 28,30 (1951).

21              Bass v. State, 92 N.Y.S.2d 42,46-47, 196 Misc. 177 (1949).

22      Utmtad v. Dolphin et al, 152 Wash. 580, 278 Pac. 681,68% {1929).

23 State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585,588 (Minn. 1944). Also: Floyd v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co/164 S.E. 28,30 (W.Va.1932);   17.5. v. Middleton, 344 Fed.2d 78., 82 (1965).

24 Greenwen v. United States, 336 Fed.2d 962, 966, 119 U.S.App.D.C 43 (1964).

24     Keefev.Hart, 213 Mass. 476, 100 N.E. 558,559 (1913).

27:Hamas v, Steeie, 64 N.E. 875,878 (1902). Also, Strombergv. Haruen, 177 Minn. 307, 225 N.W. 148,149 (1929);^

28            Madsen v. Hutchison, Sheriff, et al, 49 Idaho 358, 290 Pac. 208,209 (1930), numerous casea cited.

29 Simmons v. Vandyke, 138 Ind. 380,37 N.E. 973,974 (1894); citing: Exparte Cubreth, 49 Cal. 436 (1875); Pratt v. Hill, 16 Barb. (N.Y.) 303,307 (1853); et al.

30 Bryant v. City ofBisbce, 28 Ariz. 278,237 Pac. 380,381 (1925); State v. Miller, 31 Tex. 564,565

(1869).

31 Winston v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 386, 49 S.E.2d 611,615 (1948).

32 Bowles v. Creason et al, 156 Ore. 278, 66 Pac.(2d) 1183,1188 (1937).

33 Geldon v. Finnegan et al, 213 Wis. 539, 252 N.W. 369,372 (1934).

34   64 KB. 875,878 (1902).

35   People v. McGum,341 IB. 632,173 N.E. 754,757 (1930).

36   State v. Parker, 75 N.C. 249,250 (1876).

37   11 Ruling Cote Law, “False Imprisonment,” § 15, pp. 801-02. See also, Williams v. Zelzah Warehouse, 126 CaLApp.
28, 14 Pac.(2d) 177,178 (1932).

38   Hefler v. Hunt, 120 Me. 10, 112 A. 675,677 (1921).

39   Moron v. City ofBeckley, 67 Fed.(2d) 161,164 (1933). See also, United States v. Jama, 30 F.(2d) 530 (1929).

40   Stromberg v. Hansen, 177 Minn. 307, 225 N.W. 148,149 (1929).

41 Oxford v. Berry, 204 Mich. 197, 170 N.W. 83, 89 (1918).

42   Moron v. City ofBeddey, 67 Fed.(2d) 161,164 (1933).

43       Leger v. Warren, 62 Ohio St 500, 57 N.E. 506 (1900).

44   Mullins v. Sanders, 189 Va, 624, 54 S.E.2d 116,120 (1949); Brown v. Meier A Frank Co,, 86 F.2d 79,83 (Ore. 1939).

45   Green v. Kennedy, 48 N.Y. Rep. 653,654 (1871).

46   Hicks v. Matthews, 266 S.W.2d 846,849 (Tex. 1954)

Section 5.

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

PENALCODE
SECTION 236-237

236.  False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.

236.1.  (a) Any person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, is guilty of human trafficking and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 12 years and a fine of not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).

(b) Any person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section 266, 266h, 266i, 266j, 267, 311.1, 311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6, or 518 is guilty of human trafficking and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 8, 14, or 20 years and a fine of not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).

(g) The Legislature finds that the definition of human trafficking in this section is equivalent to the federal definition of a severe form of trafficking found in Section 7102(8) of Title 22 of the United States Code.

(h) For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply:

(1) “Coercion” includes any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process; debt bondage; or providing and facilitating the possession of any controlled substance to a person with the intent to impair the person’s judgment.

(3) “Deprivation or violation of the personal liberty of another” includes substantial and sustained restriction of another’s liberty accomplished through force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury to the victim or to another person, under circumstances where the person receiving or apprehending the threat reasonably believes that it is likely that the person making the threat would carry it out.

(4) “Duress” includes a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to cause a reasonable person to acquiesce in or perform an act which he or she would otherwise not have submitted to or performed; a direct or implied threat to destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate, or possess any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the victim; or knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or possessing any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the victim.

(5) “Forced labor or services” means labor or services that are performed or provided by a person and are obtained or maintained through force, fraud, duress, or coercion, or equivalent conduct that would reasonably overbear the will of the person.

(6) “Great bodily injury” means a significant or substantial physical injury.

(7) “Minor” means a person less than 18 years of age.

(8) “Serious harm” includes any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor, services, or commercial sexual acts in order to avoid incurring that harm.

(i) The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, the relationship between the victim and the trafficker or agents of the

trafficker, and any handicap or disability of the victim, shall be factors to consider in determining the presence of “deprivation or violation of the personal liberty of another,” “duress,” and “coercion” as described in this section.

236.2. Law enforcement agencies shall use due diligence to identify all victims of human trafficking, regardless of the citizenship of the person. When a peace officer comes into contact with a person who has been deprived of his or her personal liberty, a minor who has engaged in a commercial sex act, a person suspected of violating subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 647, or a victim of a crime of domestic violence or sexual assault, the peace officer shall consider whether the following indicators of human trafficking are present:

(a) Signs of trauma, fatigue, injury, or other evidence of poor care.

(b) The person is withdrawn, afraid to talk, or his or her communication  is censored by another person.

(c) The person does not have freedom of movement.

(f) Security measures are used to control who has contact with the person.

(g) The person does not have control over his or her own government-issued identification or over his or her worker immigration documents.

237.  (a) False imprisonment is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If the false imprisonment be effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, it shall be punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.

 DEMAND FOR ARREST

 Pursuant to the Laws of the United States, We the People DEMAND the arrest of the above named felons.

Pursuant to the statutes herein, in particular the Laws of the United States in general, We the People DEMAND that you pursue and prosecute ALL ET AL offenders that have violated their Oath of Office and the Laws of the United States.

DEMAND FOR SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE

 Pursuant to the Laws of the United States, We the People DEMAND the seizure and impound of ALL books, records and fraudulent claims made by the fictitious plaintiff, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA on the account of ALL municipalities, Counties/Townships as evidence of the ongoing felony.

 WARNING

Should any person try to cover up the felony complained of herein, BE YOU HEREBY PUT ON NOTICE: You may be indicted under USC Title 18 sections 3, 4, 241, 242, 2381, 2382, 2383 and 2384.

COMPLAINANT, being first truly sworn, states that he has knowledge of the felonies herein complained of: that it is not submitted to be vexatious, but to obtain imperative JUSTICE.

 CONCULSION

Plaintiff Gerald-E: Nichols; Free, Sovereign, Natural Person and Non corporate entity has been maliciously prosecuted and his Constitutional Rights have been violated, he has been denied as a non corporate, free and sovereign natural person not just once, but from the 1st moment that Plaintiff entered that court room. Plaintiff’s not saying that he’s an angel by any means, but, Plantiff wants to ask why this defendant administrator/judge Ira R Kaufman and defendant D. A.,  David D Hollister of Plumas county are allowed to take away ones constitutional rights; Plaintiff’s right to defend himself, because he (the defendant administrator/judge) doesn’t like the Plaintiff’s answers.

The Plaintiff doesn’t believe its what one is arrested for, but, what matters is how the law and courts are going about the arrest and prosecution in this “little charming town of Quincy in the mountains”, it’s like being in one of those little towns that the author’s Stephen King or John Saul write about. This court has become a court of revenue and taxation not of “JUSTICE.” this is also about the people’s “Constitutional Rights Being Violated”, yours and your children’s Constitution, not only for Plaintiff,  but, for every one who walks through those doors to this SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA in Plumas county.

Plaintiff was offered deals to plead guilty to intent to sell drugs and do (2) two years in the county jail, which Plaintiff is not guilty of, the Plaintiff refused so he may appeal his case if so convicted. The plaintiff has had ineffective assistance of counsel only receiving the defense that the defendants administrators/judges Kaufman/Hilde and defendant D. A. Hollister wishes him to have.

Plaintiff has respected the court by showing up and announce and to state throughout this process that Plaintiff is in court on a special appearance for the name on the docket GERALD E NICHOLS – corporation. The court record will show obvious violations of the Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights and basic human rights by when the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman does not even recognize Plaintiff, tells him to shut-up and not speak, removes Plaintiffs ‘Pro Per’ status because the defendant administrator/judge Kaufman doesn’t like Plaintiffs answers. Defendant D. A.,  Hollister states Plaintiff’s motions and filings are nonsensical at best, insulting of the dignity of the court at worst, the defendant’s motions, memoranda and ranting should be denied.

Yes, the defendant’s CONSPIRED to deny Plaintiff’s motions and pleadings, refusing to discuss or have the motions read into the record, when Plaintiff asked if the defendants had read the motions and pleading, there was no response from either defendant administrator/judge Kaufman nor, D. A., Hollister.

Furthermore, as stated above the plaintiff filed an action as soon as he was able to acquire as much information as possible.  There is so much more that has happened where this here could be a short story, but not having the $435.00 to file his action, because Plaintiff believes defendant administrator/judge Hilde, defendant administrator/judge Kaufman and defendant D. A., Hollister did CONSPIRE to deny his fee waiver.

‘Plaintiff again begs the courts indulgence.’

I have been under false imprisonments and subjected to blatant violations of my Constitutional Rights, which is the overwhelming cause for this action. It has caused me great frustration, emotional distress, anxiety. I’m not able to visit with my parents.

The defendant administrator/judge Kaufman refused Plaintiff the use of a law library or computer to help Plaintiff build his defense, and because defendant administrator/judge Kaufman did not like Plaintiff’s answers took away Plaintiff’s  right to ‘Pro Per’ status and re-appointed Public Defender that Plaintiff had in the beginning who didn’t want to defend Plaintiff from the beginning. Defendant D. A., Hollister made sexually explicit advances at the Plaintiff, by dancing around the court room and throwing Plaintiff kisses.

Again I ask you,  is this fair?

This is not how free societies operates we are suppose to have due process in this country. Plaintiff was laughed at by the defendant Sheriff Gregory Hagwood, when Plaintiff wrote him a letter and explained what was happening. Defendant Sheriff Gregory Hagwood asked Plaintiff where Plaintiff would like to be deported to, defendant Sheriff Hagwood stated he was thinking of Somaila, because Plaintiff had asked to be deported because he was not a citizen of the United States, but a Republic of America Citizen.

Plaintiff asked the court to consider if this was them, or one of their loved ones, how would they react. Wouldn’t they want JUSTICE, RESTITUTION AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THAT THIS COUNTRY GUARANTEES.

Plaintiff is seeking restitution of $25 million dollars, and the incarceration of each and everyone under all said claims and by this complaint from every defendant known and currently any Jane or John Doe defendant unknown who has alleged participated or someone who has violated each and everyone of the specifically stated codes or international treaties, laws, ect; to wit:

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED TO AMEND WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT

Submitted this _____ day of_______________, 2013.

Respectfully Submitted

by: ________________________

Gerald E Nichols ‘Pro Per’

Plaintiff

Free, Sovereign, Natural Person

Non-corporate entity

All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice

U.C.C. 1-207/1-308, U.C.C. 1-103

Gerald E Nichols

c/o P O Box 76

Vinton  CA [ 9135]

state-of-the CaliforniaRepublic

Authorized Representative, Executor/ Beneficiary

of Ex rational: GERALD E NICHOLS

                                 Opportunity to correct its own record; MOTION FOR REVERSAL OF  

                                                           OF VERDICT AND/OR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL                                                   

Gerald-E: Nichols ‘Pro Per’

Free, Sovereign, Natural Person

Non corporate entity/All rights reserved

Without Prejudice-UCC 1-207/1-308-UCC 1-103

c/o P O Box 76

VintonCA96135

530.993.4349

state-of-the CaliforniaRepublic

Authorized Representative, Executor/ Beneficiary

of Ex rational: GERALD E NICHOLS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PLUMAS

_________________________________

STATE OF CALIFORNIA                           )

FICTITIOUS FOREIGN STATE                  )           CASE: # F13-00188

Plaintiff,                                      )              JUDGE:______________

)

Gerald E Nichols “et al”                         )

‘Pro Per’                                                   )          Opportunity to correct its own record

Non corporate entity                              )           Notice of Motion for Reversal of  

Petitioner/Defendant                            )           Verdict and/or Motion for New

                                                                 )           Trial; Memorandum of Points

                                                                 )          and Authorities in Support

                                                                 )           Thereof

____________________________________/                                  

 

 Opportunity to correct its own record; Motion for Reversal of Verdict and/or Motion for New Trial; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof

 DATE:

TIME:

PLACE:

TO:  PLUMAS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY; and

TO:  CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on__________________, at the hour of ______ a.m/pm, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Petitioner/Defendant Gerald-E: Nichols: through ‘Pro Per’ counsel and as Free, Sovereign, Natural Person, Non corporate entity, All Rights Reserved, Without Prejudice UCC 1-207/1-308-UCC 1-103, will move this Court for a release and/or new trial under Penal Code sections 1181 and 1182.

 PENAL CODE 

SECTION 1181-1182 


This Motion will be based on this Notice, the attached memorandum of pointes and authorities, the pleadings and records on file herein, and upon such other and further argument as may be presented to the Court at the hearing of this matter.

Dated:  _________ ____, 2013

Respectfully submitted,

Gerald-E: Nichols:

By:  _______________________

Gerald-E: Nichols: ‘Pro Per’

Free, Sovereign, Natural Person

Non corporate entity/All rights reserved

Without Prejudice-UCC 1-207/1-308-UCC 1-103

state-of-the CaliforniaRepublic

Authorized Representative, Executor/ Beneficiary

of Ex rational: GERALD E NICHOLS

Attorney for Self

MOTION

 Petitioner/Defendant Gerald-E: Nichols: hereby motions for reversal of verdict and/or motion for a new trial on the grounds of new facts and findings, which includes evidence of discrepancies that the court, prosecution and public defender did maliciously and willfully conspired to keep from being presented. There was a Hobbs motion to quash the warrant, but the court refused to let petitioner/defendant hear or participate in, it was held behind closed doors. Evidence that could have set the Petitioner/defendant free or/and possibly the Jury may have found a different verdict of not guilty due to reasonable doubt, if it had been provided. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subds. (8) and (5); various discrepancies and legal errors (Pen. code, § 1181, subd. (5)); misdirection of the jury on legal issues (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (5)); jury misconduct (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (3)); receipt by the jury of evidence out of court (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (2)); and insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of guilt (Pen. Code, § 1181, subds. (6) and (7)).  The above grounds substantially denied defendant his right to an impartial jury and a fair trial.

Dated:  ___________  _____, 2013

Respectfully submitted,

Gerald-E: Nichols:

By:  _______________________

Gerald-E: Nichols: ‘Pro Per’

Free, Sovereign, Natural Person

Non corporate entity/All rights reserved

Without Prejudice-UCC 1-207/1-308-UCC 1-103

state-of-the CaliforniaRepublic

Authorized Representative, Executor/ Beneficiary

of Ex rational: GERALD E NICHOLS

Attorney for Self

COMES NOW, the /petitioner/defendant Gerald-E: Nichols, in propria persona (my own proper self), formerly known as the artificial person, GERALD E NICHOLS, The petitioner/defendant is not a lawyer and his pleadings cannot be treated as such. In fact, according to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

I.  This Court has authority and Opportunity to correct its own record to reverse the verdict or order a new trial on the various grounds alleged in this motion

II.

            a) Judge Ira R Kaufman does not allow or permit a constitutional argument as an affirmative defense- the law need not apply-guilty. See (2) two articles on Judge Ira R Kaufman and (1) one article on Judge Janet Hilde attached which will show the character of these judges. (Attached)

b) Jeffery Leon deYoung’s article “The Real Story of Deyoung and de Restless”, which sounds like a confession of what happened the night that petitioner/defendant was arrested. That Mr deYoung was the big kingpin, and that the sheriff’s along with the courts did maliciously and willfully conspire to violate the petitioner/defendants constitutional rights and to see that he was found guilty. (Attached)

 c) The Petitioner/defendant was arrested 18 March 2013 at 18:30 and then held for approximately 7hrs and 45mins before being booked, and then was held at least another 65 hrs before being taken before a magistrate, for total hours of 72.5hrs.

b) When the Petitioner/defendant was kidnapped by the sheriff’s and detained for approximately (2) two hours in the back of a sheriff’s vehicle, handcuffed, no air conditioning, windows rolled up, the temp was about 70 degrees. Plumas county sheriff and detectives then took Petitioner/defendant about 17 miles west towards Quincy and pulled off the side of the road and stopped in a little community called Beckwourth and Petitioner/defendant was taken out of the sheriff’s vehicle and stripped searched. When Petitioner/defendant reached the Plumas county jail was held for ransom of $200,000.00.

Duty of Officer

It is a fundamental rule of procedure well grounded in the common law, that where an arrest is made the alleged offender is to be taken “before a magistrate to be dealt with according to law”1 This is not only to be done, but done without delay, or without unnecessary delay, otherwise the arresting party is liable for a false imprisonment

In Blackstone’s Commentaries, Vol. 4, Chap. XXI, p. 292, it was stated that “A constable may, without warrant, arrest any one for a breach of the peace committed in his view, and carry him before a Justice of the peace.” The officer must bring a person he has arrested directly to a magistrate, otherwise it is a breach of duty. .

It is the duty of an officer or other person making an arrest to take the prisoner before a magistrate with reasonable diligence and without unnecessary delay; and the rule is well settled that whether the arrest is made with or without a warrant, an action for false imprisonment may be predicated upon an unreasonable delay in taking the person arrested before a magistrate regardless of the lawfulness of the arrest in the first instance.2

Thus, even if the arrest was lawful, a failure to take the person arrested to a magistrate will be regarded as unlawful imprisonment,

As the Supreme Court of Minnesota held:

Even though an arrest be lawful, a detention of the prisoner for an unreasonable time without taking him before a committing magistrate will constitute false imprisonment3

In an exhaustive decision on the common / law rule of the process and procedure for arrests, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case ‘of Orick v. State, said: “By the common law of England” an “arrest without warrant for a felony” can be made, “only for the purpose of bringing the offender before a civil magistrate.” 4

This procedure is the due process of law/ to be followed in depriving one of his liberty. Thus a failure or even a delay in following this process is an unlawful restraint or deprivation of liberty and thus a type of false imprisonment The arresting officer has no authority to take a person to a jail and detain him there. His duty is to take the one arrested without delay to a court or magistrate, as said by the Supreme Court of Kansas:

The law contemplates that an arrest either by an officer or a private personwith or without a warrant is a step in a public prosecution, and must be made with a view of taking the person before a magistrate or judicial tribunal for examination or trial; and an officer, even, subjects himself to liability if there is an unreasonable delay after an arrest in presenting the person for examination or trial.5

The only reason that can justify having an arrested person in jail or detained by the arresting officer, is as a necessary step in bringing him before a magistrate, as so stated by:

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island:

to detain the person arrested in custody for any purpose other than that of taking him before a magistrate is illegal.

Thus detainment in a jail for purposes of “booking” or fingerprinting or investigating the alleged crime, or interrogation of the prisoner is illegal.

In cases involving the commission of the most severe crimes, as in felonies, the one arresting is still required, without un­necessary delay, to bring the prisoner to the nearest magistrate or court as a matter of fundamental law:

The Court went on to state that the officer making the arrest is liable for false imprisonment if he arrests with the intent of only detaining, or if his unreasonable delay causes a detainment. On pg. 1092 it stated:

It cannot be questioned that, when a person is arrested, either with or without a warrant, it becomes the duty of the officer or the individual making the arrest to convey the prisoner in a reasonable time, and without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate. to be dealt with as the exigency of the case may require. The power to make the arrest does not include the power to unduly detain in custody; but, on the contrary, is coupled with a correlative duty, incumbent on the officer, to take the accused before a magistrate ‘as soon. as he reasonably can’ (authorities cited). If the officer fails to do this, and unreasonably detains. the accused in custody, he will be guilty of a false imprisonment, no matter how lawful the original arrest may have been. (Citing, 1 Hil. Torts, pp. 213-14, sec. 9).

Though this case involved an arrest without warrant, the Court said it is the duty of the arresting officer upon making an arrest, “whether with a warrant or without one,” to carry the offender at once before a justice.

To take an arrested person to a jail to be detained and fingerprinted is a violation of his rights. It is proof the officer had no intent to bring the accused directly to a judge.

In Anderson’s Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs, the subject of an officer’s duty after arrest was examined with this conclusion:   It is the undoubted right on the part of a prisoner, on being arrested

by a public officer or private citizen, and un­questionably a corresponding duty on the part of the one making the arrest, to take the prisoner before a court or magistrate for a hearing or examination and this must be done without unnecessary delay. The object of this right and corresponding duty is that the prisoner may be examined, held, or dealt with as the law directs and the facts of the case require. * * * It is highly improper and an invasion of the lawful rights of the prisoner to take him to any other place than to a proper court or magistrate.10

In deciding the proper duty and action of an arresting officer after making an arrest, the Supreme Court of Appeals for Virginia stated that the right of the accused to prompt judicial examination does not depend upon their statute law:

But even if the circumstances of the arrest were not within the purview of this particular statute, it was the duty of the arresting officer to have taken the defendant within a reasonable time, or without unnecessary delay, before a judicial officer in order that the latter might inquire into the matter and determine whether a warrant should be issued for the detention of the defendant, or whether he should be released.11

Coupled with the authority to arrest went an imperative obligation on the officer to bring the arrested person before a magistrate without un­reasonable delay. -Especially was this true where the arrest had been made without a warrant. * * ‘ When an officer makes an arrest, without warrant, it is his duty to take the person arrested, without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate or other proper judicial officer having jurisdiction, in order that he may be examined and held or dealt with as the case requires; but to detain ^ the person arrested in custody for any purpose other than that of taking him before a magistrate is illegal: 12

We believe that fundamental fairness to the accused requires that he should with reasonable promptness be taken before a magistrate in order to prevent the application of methods approaching what is commonly called the “third degree.” “Fundamental fairness” prohibits the secret inquisition in order to obtain evidence.”‘13

Other reasons for the purpose of this rule requiring that the arrested accused “be taken^ before a magistrate as quickly as possible, is to make certain that the person arrested is advised

by a judicial officer of his con­stitutional rights.”14 This is not a duty of the officer through the erroneous “Miranda Warning.” The only reason such warnings are being used is because police are not doing their duty in bringing the person arrested to a judicial officer, but instead are unlawfully taking them to a jail to have them “booked.”

The detainment of a person after he is arrested is a judicial question. A judicial officer must decide if there are grounds for holding the person arrested, or whether he must be further examined by trial, or if he is to be bailed and released. To allow the executive department such powers of decision making is the epitome of despotism.

 In a suit for false imprisonment where several officers arrested the plaintiff, on grounds he committed a felony, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the officers had no right to decide to detain the plaintiff to enable them to make a further investigation of the charge against him.

The Court declared that:

But having so arrested him, it was their [the officers'] duty to take him before a magistrate, who could determine whether or not there was ground to hold him. It was not for the arresting officers to settle that question (authorities cited). * * * The arresting officer is in no sense his guardian, and can Justify the arrest only by bringing the prisoner before the proper court, that either the prisoner may be liberated or that further proceedings may be instituted against him.16

In a case where one was accused by another of stealing a watch, and sub­sequently arrested and put in jail for one hour and then released, the sheriff was found guilty of false imprisonment as be “failed to take the person arrested before a, magistrate.” The Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the conviction stating that:

[T]he power of detaining a person arrested, or restraining him, of his liberty^is not a matter within the discretion of the officer making the arrest.17

 The Court further stated that the sheriff cannot legally hold the person arrested in custody for a longer period of time than is reasonably necessary, under all the circumstances of the case, without possessing a proper warrant of taking him before a magistrate. If he does it is false imprison­ment. Thus where a sheriff had arrested two prisoners and detained them for five hours without making any effort to take them before a magistrate, he was guilty of false imprisonment. In this case the Supreme Court of Idaho said:

The rule seems to be that an officer arresting a person on criminal process who omits to perform a duty required by law, such as taking the prisoner before a court, becomes liable for false imprisonment.

The law never allows an officer at his dis­cretion to imprison the person arrested or detain him in a jail after arrest: [1]

 The Court should take this opportunity to correct its own record and grant a reverse of verdict or grant new trial based upon this newly discovered findings and facts

III. The Petitioner/Defendant’s Public Defender, Douglas Prouty was ineffective and inadequate counsel Public Defender Douglas Prouty stated that he didn’t even want to defend the Petitioner/defendant.

      1) Public Defender Douglas Prouty failed to claim due process in this arrest case for the petitioner/defendant over this period of time and this certainly does not say much about Public Defender Douglas Prouty or about those in the legal profession. The incompetency of most lawyers was expressed by Chief Justice Warren Burger when he stated that “nine out of ten lawyers are incompetent.” Most lawyers are not independent thinkers; instead they are nothing more than programmed robots who follow the path laid down by the prevailing system-whether it be just or corrupt. When it becomes corrupt, they will follow corrupt rules and statutes above the fundamental law.[2]

A.  The Public Defender Douglas Prouty gave only the defense that judge Kaufman, judge Hilde and D.A., Hollister wanted him to have.

a)  P.D., Prouty failed to claim the due process clause. This failure on the part of lawyers is especially remarkable when we consider the ancient existence of this due process guarantee, and that it is prominently found not only in our constitution, but in Magna Carta.

B.  Petitioner/defendant was denied to represent himself and present the case as the Petitioner/defendant saw that it should have been presented.

 C. All motions were denied without being read, Petitioner/defendant started reading the motions into the record when he was stopped by judge Kaufman, who said that he would not allow the Petitioner/defendant to do that. When Petitioner/Defendant asked judge Kaufman and D. A., Hollister if they had read the motions, there was no reply from either the judge or the D. A.

D. The motions that Petitioner/defendant submitted to the court that were not read by judge or d.a. and denied:

1. Writ of error, Coram Nobis

2. Writ of error, Coram non Judice

3. Non Slave owner Coram Nobis

4. Trading with the enemy act

5. Petition to withdraw plea

6. Motion to dismiss

All these motions are included in this motion for new trial.

 The Court should take this opportunity to correct its own record or grant a reversal of verdict or new trial based upon this newly discovered facts and findings

IV. The Petitioner/defense has recently discovered discrepancies in the PCSO Supplement Reports.

Date of Incident: 03/18/13 time of incident: 17:39

A.  Notice of Non-Judicial forfeiture proceedings:

PCSO#:  2013002347

Date    :   03/18/2013

Description of Property: U.S. Currency

Appraised Value: $253.00

a) Affidavit from Nina Blum that she did hereby give to Gerald Nichols approximately $253.00 on or about 18th of March 2013 to assist him for his living of, which the PSCO did take from him. Executed on 23rd of April 2013.

B.  Notice of Non-Judicial forfeiture proceedings:

PSCO#: 2013002846

Date     : 04/04/2013

Description of Property: U.S. Currency

Appraised Value: $150.00

a) Affidavit from Nina Blum that she did hereby give to Gerald Nichols $150.00 to assist him for his living, 4th of April 2013 due to the previous monies being taken by the PSCO. Executed on 23rd of April 2013.

b) she had also did leave some fentanyl patches in the care of Jeff de Young,  that the sheriff’s office found and tried to sell to Stacia McCoy.

C. See attached affidavit

D. pg 1- case no. F13-00188

Date: March 22, 2013

Event type: Bail or O/R Hearing

Judge: Ira R Kaufman

1. this case # F13-00188 was not assigned until after the arrest of April 4, 2013, the original case # was F13-00228 so, why is the case # F13-00188 stated on the O/R document that they used for arrest on 4th April 2013?

2. This O/R  document they used and said that Petitioner/defendant had signed, but there are no signatures, of judge kaufman or a gerald nichols.

E.  Page 1 of Plumas CO Sheriff’s Office

Incident #: 2013002347

Date of Incident: 03/18/13

Time of Incident: 17:29

Complainant: NO COMPLAINANT

Case # wrote across top of Page: F12-00188 – Incorrect Case #.

F. Pg 3- item #: 14427: magazine with pieces of paper torn out of it, which Det Beatley swore to in court which was used as bindles for controlled substances.

See pg 11 item #: 11454, description: methamphetamine in paper bindle.

Quantity: 0.19

Owner: Jeffery Leon de Young

See pg 18 9th and 10th paragraphs states:

During the initial protective sweep of the residence, the door to the bedroom on the left side of the hallway, directly across from Nichols room, was shut and locked. _____ johns forced open the door and found the room unoccupied. Sgt Hermann assisted in clearing the room. He then advised me he located a “paper bindle containing suspected methamphetamine in the room.”

I went into the room and looked at the small alcove just to the left of the door. There “I observed a torn piece of paper that had been folded into a bindle and then unfolded. There was a white crystalline substance in the bindle” I recognized as methamphetamine.

These statements contradict Det Beatley’s testimony that the petitioner/defendant was using pieces of a magazine for bindle’s for controlled substances, the one that was using the magazine for bindle’s was Jeffery Leon de Young.

The Court should  take this opportunity to correct its own record or grant a reverse of verdict or grant new trial based upon this newly discovered facts and findings

G.  Pg 4 – Offender # 2: Jeffery Leon de Young: – not at residence when arrest came down. Jeff de Young Miranda on 3/18/2013- Residence Status: R

Offender # 3: Stacia Marie McCoy: arrested 3/18/2013

Miranda on 3/19/2013

Residence Status: R

H. Pg 5 – Offender #4: Gerald Edmund Nichols: arrested 3/18/2013

Miranda on 3/19/2013

Residence Status: NON-RESIDENT

VICTM:       State of California

Address Unknown: 00000000

Residence Status: R

I.    Pg 6 – Reporting Officer signed: Date: 3/19/13 Time: 1650

J. Plumas Co Sheriff’s Office Property:

Pg 11- Property: item #: 14453:E Machine Computer Tower-serial/vin: qa31bk0001505, model #: t1100/

Pg 13 – Property: item #14460-E Machine Computer Tower-serial/vin: ptnae0501584709F32001, model #:el1200-06w

Petitioner/defendant stated that there was only (1) one black e-machine. One that belonged to is five (5) year old daughter,

Question: did the sheriff’s office compromise the evidence by mixing up someone else’s evidence with the Petitioner/defendants ??????

K. Pg 11 – item #: 14454: paper bindle – Jeff de Young, see pgs 3 & 18.

The Court should grant a reversal of verdict or a new trial based upon this newly discovered facts and findings

L. SUPPLEMENT REPORT:

1. pg 16: date of search warrant: author: Christopher Hendrickson

1st paragraph states: On 03-19-13 at 1645

            QUESTION? Was the search warrant served on the 18th of March or the 19th of March?

1st paragraph states: on 03-19-13 at 1645: petitioner/defendants cellular telephone rang and I saw the caller identification as “Stacia”, I know a Stacia McCoy and believed the caller was McCoy. “I” answered the telephone and “I” said “hello” and McCoy said “hello G” “it’s Stacia” and asked “G” if he still had fentanyl patches left. “I” said “yes” (during the search of nichols’ bedroom 5 fentanyl patches were located on a shelf). McCoy then said that she had a friend that wanted some. “I” told McCoy to come over. McCoy then said she did not have enough money. “I” told McCoy that “I” would “front” McCoy the fentanyl patches. McCoy said she would be right over. “I” asked McCoy how long and she said “five minutes”.

I ask you to refer back to IV, A & B, where Nina Blum had submitted a statement that the fentanyle patches were her prescription and that when she had visited the Petitioner/defendant that she had left them by accident. So, as you can see the Petitioner/defendant was not trying to sell fentanyl patches to Stacia McCoy, but the sheriff’s office was. And although this count had been dropped, we did see D. A., Hollister bring it up again, and again and never a explanation from the D. A., that the fentanyle belonged to Nina Blum, nor, did we ever hear any objections from the Petitioner/defendants so-called Public Defender Douglas Prouty or questions to contradicting this.

2. pg 17: date of search warrant: author: Jeremy Beatley

1st paragraph state: On 03/18/2013 at approximately 1645-Please refer back to Supplement report pg 16 by Christopher Hendrickson, where he stated the search warrant was served on 03-19-13 at 1645.

QUESTION?  Was the search warrant served on the 18th of March or the 19th of March?

3. pg 17: 4th paragraph states: author: Jeremy Beatley

Prior to searching, I videotaped the interior of the residence. Upon completion of the search the interior of the residence was again videotaped. This video recording was later entered into PCSO property as evidence. BUT, how could Det Beatley enter this video and camera into PCSO property as evidence, when by his own omission this video and camera were stolen.  It’s not that he later filed a report loss of evidence, it is just another discrepancy.

4. pg 18: 1st paragraph states: Below the drawer of the nightstand there was a magazine with many of the pages torn out in dissimilar square and rectangular shapes. I recognized this is a common method of making paper bindles for

controlled substances.

3rd paragraph he mentions the finding of the (5) fentanyl patches.

Again, I ask you to refer back to F.  pg 3, 11, & 18, in the sheriff’s report, which refers to Jeffery Leon de Young where the sheriff’s found that Jeffery de Young is the one that they found with methamphetamine in paper bindles.

Again, I ask you to refer back to IV, A & B:

a) Affidavit from Nina Blum that she did hereby give to Gerald Nichols $150.00 to assist him for his living, due to the previous monies being taken by the Plumas County Sheriff’s. Executed on 23rd of April 2013.

b) also the fentanyl patches that the sheriff’s office found and tried to sell to Stacia McCoy.

C. See attached affidavit

M. SUPPLEMENT REPORT – Author: Steven W Peay:

1. Pg 1: 1st Paragraph states: On 03-19-13 at 1645-Please refer back to Supplement Report pg 16, by Christopher Hendrickson where he stated that the search warrant was served on 03-19-13 at 1645, and Supplement Report pg 17, by Jeremy Beatley who stated that the search warrant was served on 03/18/13 approximately at 1645.

QUESTION? Was the search warrant served on the 18th of March or the 19th of March?

2. Pg 1: 2nd Paragraph states: I conducted interviews with 4 subjects FRC college students who reside in the up stairs portion of the residence. Line 8 & 9: Jeffery de Young is the home owner and they pay their rent to him, $175.00 and Line 9 & 10: they talked about another subject named “Gerry”. In court when d.a., Hollister asked if he the Petitioner/defendant was know as “Gerry”? The Petitioner/defendant stated he, “NEVER” went by the name “Gerry”.

3. Pg 1: 3rd Paragraph states: After talking with the four subjects I was told by det Hendrickson that he had answered Gerald Nichols cell phone when it rang while searching  Nichols bedroom. The caller i.d., showed a named of “Stacia” who was later identified as Stacia McCoy. Hendrickson said she was on her way to the residence to pick up some “fentanyl. Approximately 10 minutes later, a subject who I am familiar with as Stacia McCoy drove into the driveway. ______________ and I walked to the front door. McCoy knocked on the front door. I saw Det Beatley open the front door and Dep Froggatt said “hello”. Det Beatley went outside with McCoy. McCoy was detained in handcuffs by Dep Froggatt.

I sat down with McCoy in the back yard and advised her she was not under arrest but only……

Pg 2: 1st paragraph stated: detained. I attempted to record our conversation but apparently did not push the record button.

Pg 2:  4th paragraph stated: I asked McCoy if what she was doing was bad, she said “yes”. I asked her what she thought about what she was doing, she said, “A felony”. I asked her what should happened to that person, she said, “Go to Jail”. I ended the conversation with McCoy. The statement was recorded and the recording placed into evidence.

Please refer back to the statement above Pg 2: 1st paragraph stated: I attempted to record our conversation but apparently did not push the record button. But, on  Pg 2: 4th Paragraph lines 3 & 4, Peay stated that “the statement was recorded and the recording placed into evidence”.

QUESTION????  Did he attempt to record the conversation and didn’t push the record button, or was the statement recorded and placed into evidence. Which was it, just another discrepancy.

N. SuperiorCourtofCaliforniaCounty of Plumas:

SEARCH WARRANT

1. 1ST page of search warrant top section, the warrant shows that it was signed but, by who? Is it judge Ira Kaufman?

1st page of search warrant bottom section, affidavit by Jeremy Beatley Plumas county sheriff’s office. The warrant shows that it was signed but again, by who? Is it Jeremy Beatley signature?

2. 4th page of search warrant signatures:

a) the judges signature does not look the same as on the 1st page.

b) the affiant signature does not look the same as on the 1st page.

3. 2nd page of search warrant:

a) the affiant is familiar with residence from several prior searches.

b) sheriff’s were to establish the identity of the person(s) in control of the premises.  (which would have been Jeffery Leon de Young as he was the owner) if you refer back to Det Peay’s conversation with the FRC stutdents and their statement in his supplement report: 2nd paragraph lines 8 & 9: Jeffrey de Young is the home owner and they pay their rent to him, $175.00 a month.

  The Court should take this opportunity to correct its own record or grant a reversal of verdict or new trial based upon this newly discovered evidence

V.  The Denial of the Motion for change of venue deprived the petitioner/defendant of a fair and impartial jury.  A new trial should be ordered because of this ..

The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the United States and California Constitutions.

The denial of petitioner/defendant change of venue motions deprive him of that right

The petitioner/defendant request change of venue of the court and was denied. The petitioner/defendant request was due to D. A. Hollister releasing a a story about the petitioner/defendant, March 28, 2013 and on July 12th the D. A. requested a gag order not to speak with anyone that might be a potential juror. What does the D. A., and judge think that newspaper story dated 24 July 2013 about the petitioner was doing when he released it to the newspaper Feather River Publishing. Each story wrote by Dan McDonald managing editor.

Therefore, a change of venue should have been granted to ensure petitioner/defendant a fair trial in this case

The Court should take this opportunity to correct its own record or grant a reversal of verdict or a new trial based upon these new facts and findings

VI. The judge extorted the jury by telling them that if they did not serve on this jury that they would be called to another trial which could last 6 to 8 weeks, so if they did this trial then they would be excused from jury duty for the next (3) three years.

The Court erred by not removing jurors number 1 and juror number 6-jury foreman, it became apparent that the jurors’ deliberations were influenced by matters outside which the evidence adduced in court and by the verdict that the jury came back with.

1. Juror number 1:  At 1:30pm  on 8/14/2013 Witness Det. Jeremy Beatley spoke with juror’s spouse for about 30 minutes.

2. Juror and jury foreman, number 6: a neighbor of D. A. Hollister

The errors mandate a new trial

The Court committed error by not removing both Jurors number 1 and jury foreman Juror number 6

1.  It was error not to remove the first Juror number 1

2.  It was error not to remove the second Juror and jury foreman number 6

The Court should take this opportunity to correct its own records or grant a reversal of verdict or a new trial based upon these new facts and findings

VII.  This Court should rule that the evidence in this case was insufficient to support the Jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

VIII.  The Court erred by instructing the Jury on completely discounting the testimony of the petitioner/defendant.

CONCLUSION

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.  This Court has authority to reverse the verdict or order a new trial on the various grounds alleged in this motion.

Petitioner/defendant Gerald-Edmund: Nichols: moves for a reverse of the verdict or a new trial under Penal Code sections 1181 and 1182 on the grounds set forth in the motion above.  More specifically, Petitioner/defendant seeks for a reversal of the verdict or new trial for the following reasons:

  • The Petitioner/defendant has recently discovered enough discrepancies in the sheriff’s warrant and reports that the court, prosecution and public defender did maliciously and willfully conspired to keep this evidence from being presented  they failed to disclose any of this evidence during petitioner/defendants trial. The Public Defender went out of his way to conspire with the court and District Attorney to make sure that the Petitioner/defendant would be found guilty.  (Pen. Code, § 1181, subds. (8) and (5));
  • The Court has erroneously denied Petitioner/defendants motions calling them ranting and ravings and the D. A., said that any motions that the Petitioner/defendant put forth should be denied. Motion for change of venue, was denied. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (5));
  • The Court erred by not removing the two Jurors Number 1, and Juror number 6 (which was the Jury foreman) when it became clear that verdict was influenced by matters outside the evidence presented in court (Pen. Code, § 1181, subds. (2), (3) and (5);
  • The evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict (Pen. Code, § 1181, subds. (6) and (7);
  • The Court erred by instructing the jury that they could completely disregard the Petitioner/defendants testimony (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (5();
  • The Court erred by instructing on flight as consciousness of guilt (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (5));
  • The Court erred by admitting that Det Beatley was a expert on whether or not methamphetamine is possessed for personal use or for sale, and using the word of a convicted drug user Jeffery Leon de’Young who himself is on probation and has been in several mental hospitals if only but for a couple of weeks at a time. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (5));

In determining whether to grant the new trial motion, this Court is not limited to the above statutory grounds.  The motion may be granted on grounds not stated in section 1181 if the Court concludes that any non-statutory grounds denied the defendant a fair trial.  (See, e.g., People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582; People v. Sherrod (1997) 59 C.A.4th 1168, 1174.)  This power derives from the trial court’s constitutional obligation to ensure a criminal defendant a fair trial.  (See, e.g., People v. Davis (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 106, 110.)

II. The Petitioner/defendant has recently discovered discrepancies in the PCSO search warrant and supplemental reports, discrepancies that the court, prosecution and public defender did maliciously and willfully conspired to keep from being presented. The court failed to listen to when it was presented in a Hobbs motion. Evidence that could have set the Petitioner/defendant free. And possibly the Jury may have found a different verdict if it had be provide.

A.  Background Facts

Approximately (3) three months before the trial, the public defender produced a statement from Petitioner/defendants sister stating that she had given the Petitioner/defendant money on both the occasions first being on or about the 18th of March 2013 to help him with his living expenses in or around the amount of $253.00 and again on or about the 4th of April and that when she had went to visit the Petitioner/defendant she had accidentally left her prescription of fentanyle in the care of  Jeffery de Young.

The petitioner/defendant has also discovered that Jeffery de Young has wrote a story called “The Real Story of DeYoung and de Restless” that is just to much of a coincidence that Jeffery de Young’s story of himself being a big kingpin and sounding as though he is confessing to the story put out by Dan McDonald managing editor of the Feather River Publishing Co. If the jury had heard this evidence would they have really found the petitioner/defendant guilty.

B.  The Court should take this Opportunity to correct its own record, grant a reversal of verdict or grant a new trial based upon this newly discovered facts and finding.

A criminal defendant may secure a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.  ( Pen. Code Section 1181 (8).)  The motion must be supported by declarations or affidavits — it is not necessary to produce witnesses at the hearing.  (People v. Trujillo (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 547, 557.)

To entitle the defendant to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show the following:

(1) The evidence itself, not just its materiality, is newly discovered.

(2) The evidence is not cumulative to that already presented.

(3) If the evidence were presented at a retrial, a different result would be probable.

(4) The defendant could not have discovered the evidence earlier using reasonable diligence.

(5) These facts are shown by the best evidence that can be obtained under the circumstances. (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 212.)

In this case, the newly discovered evidence meets all five factors.  The facts and findings itself was newly discovered (at least to the defense) – the tip that led to its discovery did not come until the trial was almost completed and took several weeks to piece together.

As for the second factor, the evidence is certainly not cumulative.  There was nothing in the trial related to this evidence because the Petitioner/defense was unaware that it existed.

If the facts and findings were presented at a retrial, it is highly probable a different result would have occurred. Furthermore, it is not clear what other evidence that the court, prosecution and public defender did maliciously and willfully conspired to keep from being presented who were- given the failure to turn over the evidence it may well be that there are additional exculpatory evidence.  This evidence, and any additional evidence that could be garnered from these leads, would present serious issues for a jury to consider on retrial and would likely result in a very different outcome especially when given the tenuous nature of the other evidence relied upon by the prosecution.

The defense could not have discovered the evidence using reasonable diligence because these facts and findings were being maliciously and willfully kept from being presented by the court, prosecution and public defender did conspired to do so..

Finally, these facts are shown by the best evidence that can be obtained under the circumstances. The Petitioner/defendants family were the ones who found this additional evidence and this is the best evidence the defense can provide.

The court, prosecution and public defender did maliciously and willfully conspired to keep from being presented and failure to present these fact and findings that could have potentially exonerated Petitioner/defendant, an all-too-familiar pattern during the trial, now mandates a reversal of verdict or granting the defendant a new trial.  This newly discovered facts and findings provides a powerful alternative theory as to what may have happened that night,

This statement directly from Jeffery de Young’s story/article “4 residents were arrested after deputies served phony search warrant at the drug way station of reported kingpin de Young and de Restless – 250 S. Mill Creek Road”.,

and especially if the Petitioner/defendant is given the full story of how the court, prosecution and public defender did maliciously and willfully conspired against him. Given the lack of evidence produced at the first trial, it is highly likely that the introduction of the new facts and findings would produce a different result.  Thus, the court should be admonish along with the prosecution and the public defender to provide the defense all material related to this investigation and grant the defendant a reversal of verdict or a new trial on the basis of recently discovered facts and findings.

This Court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to introduce highly prejudicial and irrelevant testimony. Specifically, the Court allowed the prosecution to introduce into evidence regarding fentanyl patches of which that charge had been dismissed/dropped, but, yet allowed the prosecution to raise this again and again, also so called evidence of a gun and ammunition, that the petitioner/defendant told the court belonged to Mr deYoung.

The Court should take this opportunity to correct its own records or grant a reversal of verdict or a new trial based upon these new facts and findings.

Footnotes:

2 CJ.S., “False Imprisonment,” §§ 30, 31, pp. 545-547.   Also: Peckham v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 36 Cal. App.2d 214, 97 Pac.2d 472,474 (1939);  Oxford v. Berry, 204 Mich. 197, 170 N.W. 83,88 (1918).

3.”. Ktedan v. Glascock, 215 Minn. 417, 10 N.W.2d 394,397 (1943).

4   Orick v. State, 140 Miss. 184,105 So. 465,470 (1925),  citing, Kurtz v.Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487,499 (1885).

     5      Gamier v. Squires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 Fac. 1005,1007 (1900).

     6 Komuuky v. Durand, 64 R JL 387,12 AtLZd 652,655 (1940).   Authorities cited,

10 Winston v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 386, 49 SJB.2d 611,615 (1948). Authorities cited therein.

11 Eominsky k Durand, 64 R.1.387, 12 AtUd 652,654, (1940). Authorities cited therein.

12 Eominsky k Durand, 64 R.1.387, 12 AtUd 652,654, (1940). Authorities cited therein.

13State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585,588 (Minn. 1944). Also: Floyd v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co/164 S.E.

 14 ,30 (W.Va.1932);   17.5. v. Middleton, 344 Fed.2d 78., 82 (1965).

     16 Keefev.Hart, 213 Mass. 476, 100 N.E. 558,559 (1913).

17: Hamas v, Steeie, 64 N.E. 875,878 (1902). Also, Strombergv. Haruen, 177 Minn. 307, 225 N.W. 148,149 (1929);^

[1] [1] Charles a Weisman “Treaties of Arrest and False Imprisonment” © Dec 1993 by

Published by Weisman Publications P O Box 22405 Egan MN 55122 Charles A Weisman 2nd edition Dec 1994, 3rd edition Nov 1996 ISBN 1-929205-08-2 Printed in the United States of America

2 [1] Charles a Weisman “Treaties of Arrest and False Imprisonment” © Dec 1993 by

Published by Weisman Publications P O Box 22405 Egan MN 55122 Charles A Weisman 2nd edition Dec 1994, 3rd edition Nov 1996 ISBN 1-929205-08-2 Printed in the United States of America

D. A., BREAKS JUDGES GAG ORDER

my son (gerald) was arrested back in april of this year and the judge Ira R Kaufman and d. a.,  David D Hollister of plumas county are allowed to take away his constitutional rights. his right to defend himself, because he (the judge)  didn’t like gerald’s answers. at least 10 times on monday 22 of july 2013 i heard gerald ask the judge to keep his ‘pro per’ status and requested adequate counsel and the judge refused. gerald asked the judge about the gag order that the judge implemented, and two days later the d. a., put this big story out about “man facing drug charges tests court’s patience before trial” and it is full of lies and discrepancies. i had went to the newspaper this last april and asked for this case to be investigated, but they refused, again i went on 23 of july 2013 and asked for the newspaper to investigate the judge, d.a., and the sheriff’s office in the crimes that they were committing, and to speak with my son they refuse, but the story that d. a., Hollister had released about gerald was already in the newspaper.

i have called all over the state of california for help for my son. i called the governors office, attorney general, doj, fbi, u.s. marshalls, highway patrol, and other law enforcement outside of this county of plumas california, and was told its not in their jurisdiction.

i have also learned that there are no checks and balances on what these judges can do. they have the right to set them selves  up as GOD’s on earth, because evidently they are beyond the arms of the law.

people this is not the only county that this happening to it is happening in little communities across the nation. how many videos and news stories are out there about judges, d.a., and law enforcement that are not abiding by the constitution.

According to the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, clause 2) of the United States Constitution,

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

As the Supreme Court stated in Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008), a federal law that conflicts with a state law will trump, or “preempt”, that state law:

Consistent with that command, we have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981)

the judge of this court took an oath to uphold and support the constitution of california, and his blatant disregard of that obligation and allegiance can only result in an act of treason.

if this court departs from the clear meaning of the constitution, it will be regarded as a blatant act of TYRANNY. any exercise of power which is done without the support of law or beyond what the law allows is tyranny.

it has been said, with much truth, “here the law ends, tyranny begins.” ‘Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 702 (1881)

the constitution requires that all laws have enacting clauses and titles. if these clear and unambiguous provisions of the state constitution can be disregarded, then we no longer have a constitution in this state, and we no longer live under a government of laws but a government of me, i.e., a system that is governed by the arbitrary will of those in office. the creation of the “california statues” is a typical example of the arbitrary acts of government which have become all too prevalent in this century. its use as law is a nullity under our constitution.

A Maxim of Law states: a judge who exceeds his office or jurisdiction is not to be obeyed. he who exercises judicial authority beyond his proper limits can not be obeyed with safety or impunity. (see Maxim of Law, edited by C. Weisman, 63z, 66m)

Quincy, Plumas County, California….

21 July 2013

 a complaint has been filed with the sheriff’s office on tuesday 16 july 2013 approximately 8 am with sheriffs officer THOMAS JOHN FROGGATT Quincy, Plumas County, California against Superior Court Judge, Ira R KAUFMAN, D. A., DAVID D. HOLLISTER for extorting the people’s “Constitutional Rights                         

judge KAUFMAN and d.a. HOLLISTER will extort you with your freedom, as all those who have entered in that court room (the people) who waive their rights, the judge practices from the bench, adds fraudulent charges, is perpetrating fraud against the people of plumas and America. No representation unless it’s their (judge/d.a.) way. will strike down every motion or pleadings

extorting huge fines and assessments from the people who walk through the those doors, to fill their coffers and who knows where the rest of the money goes, because it surly is not going to the upkeep of the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, there is no honor or respect for this court house or its people. 

“California’s defense of trying to limit such a display of the laws seems pretty ridiculous:

“We exercise our copyright to benefit the people of California,   a quote from Linda Brown, State of California deputy director of the Office of Administrative Law, which manages the state’s laws.”  “We are obtaining compensation for the people of California.”In other words, we hide the laws you have to obey from you in order to get more money into the state’s coffers.” http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080904/0433382169.shtml

could the above statement from linda brown be construed as EXTORTION?

 A complaint against the sheriff of plumas county GREGORY HAGWOOD, because he refuses to file this complaint, and he knows that the judge kaufman and d.a., Hollister are committing these crimes, of which he is and his whole department are named.

 This is a sheriff who (4) four months ago told me that he was a constitutional sheriff and he nor any of his officers would ever violate any ones constitutional rights’but, this week the sheriff informed me that he has heard of the constitutional movement and it was just a bunch of “crap” and he would not speak of this again, and that he was not going to be arresting any judges or d. a.., which means that he would have to arrest himself and his whole department.

 I’m asking for an investigation in to this plumas county superior court, judge IRA R KAUFMAN, d.a., DAVID D HOLLISTER, public defenders and from SHERIFF, GREGORY HAGWOOD, all the sheriff’s department and down to the very lowest position of the plumas county correctional facility and anyone else that come out of the wood work.

 for additional information and to join in this cause please contact me at e-mail nyb121@gmail.com

 I’m asking that the people of plumas county California to join this cause and to ‘BAND’ together and take back your community and your county, it now lies in your hands. we can continue to live under this tyranny, treason, and extortion.  

if there is anyone out there that could or would help us please contact me asap

thank you